Franco-Dutch Unemployment Among Muslim Minorities:

A comparison and analysis of the system and policies affecting Muslim minorities in the Netherlands and in France

---

Evi Collins, *Master's Student at Institute for European Studies at Tbilisi State University, Georgia*

Summer Semester 2012, Final Thesis

Nani Macharashvili, *Thesis Supervisor, PhD in Political Science, Associate Professor Tbilisi State University, Georgia*

ABSTRACT

Unemployment and its social impact and fiscal implications are one of the main policy areas focused on by the member states of the European Union. Unemployment is not equally distributed, however, amongst all members of a particular society: there are differences based on demographics ranging from age and gender to education and marital status. Ethnicity has shown to be an important factor as well. All across Europe, unemployment amongst minority populations differs from that of the majority population; usually with higher numbers amongst the minority groups. This is especially so for the Muslim minorities from Turkey and northern Africa. While this problem is Europe-wide, this research focuses on two countries in specific: France and the Netherlands. Discussed herein, in the context of determining which French or Dutch policies are the most successful at reducing unemployment among the Muslim minority are: the history of these migrant groups in both countries; the unemployment situation in both France and the Netherlands, some other factors in addition to ethnic origin that influence unemployment in this minority group; both general and minority-specific policies that have been made to deal with the problem of unemployment, and their impact—(positive and negative); as well as a comparison/contrast section discussing the similarities and differences between the countries' approach, the policies and their success. The main theory as to why these appear to "work" while others exacerbate the problem or create other problems is Costoiu's (2008) theory that an assimilative approach to integration is more successful than a multicultural one. As a result of the analysis done within the comparative analysis framework, it is determined that policies targeting entrepreneurship, improving language and job-hunting skills, and promoting diversity are the most successful in reducing Muslim minority unemployment; while those policies that a) disproportionately disadvantage the minority group, b) address only a periphery concern other than unemployment, c) further marginalize the minority or

d) are ineffective or unnecessary have the greatest negative impact on the unemployment problem. Some policies, especially ones aimed at promoting entrepreneurship, are suggested to further improve the situation in both France and the Netherlands, and potentially in other EU countries as well.

Keywords: *France, the Netherlands, Muslim minority, unemployment, integration, public policies*

Contents

Introduction

This research aims to compare and contrast French and Dutch public policies as they apply to, and have an impact on, unemployment among members of the Muslim minority groups in both countries, and to evaluate them for their effectiveness in solving the problem. In order to support this analysis, related topics such as: the general unemployment situation in the European Union (EU), the history of the minority groups in both France and the Netherlands, unemployment trends specifically in each of those countries, unemployment among the Muslim minority members, policies aimed at reducing general unemployment in both countries, and policies targeted directly at the Muslim minority group; are introduced and discussed. This background, combined with the models, and using the methodology, described below, enables a rich and meaningful comparison and contrast between the approach of the two countries towards this common problem, the policies they have implemented in an effort to solve the problem and the results, with the final goal being an answer to the questions:

- *Which general approach to integration seems to have a higher success rate, at least in terms of unemployment indicators*? *And, if possible, why? What theories serve to explain the success of this particular approach?*

- *Which specific policies have had the most positive effect on lowering the numbers of unemployment among the Muslim minority population in either France or the Netherlands? And, what are some theories or explanations for why these were successful?*

- *Which specific policies, or policy approaches, have had the least desirable impact on unemployment in this minority? What are the lessons to be learned? What should France and the Netherlands endeavor to avoid when making policies to address this group? What are the theories or explanations for the negative results*

incurred?

- *Based on the above, what approaches and or policies would be recommended for future policy makers in France and the Netherlands in order to best try to reduce the problem of Muslim minority unemployment in their countries? What is the theoretical, or experiential basis of these recommendations?*

In this introduction, the research approach, methodology, and models used in this study, as well as its scope; are introduced and explained. In order to attempt to answer the questions above, it is necessary to: describe the approach and methodology used; describe the models applied; introduce and explain the literature upon which the research is based; and define the scope of the study itself; in order to elucidate clearly the principles and hypotheses that give direction and structure to the research.

The "Methodology" section presents the general approach undertaken in this research, and the theoretical framework of comparative analysis it uses. Discussions of, and references to, the literature that this study is based upon are sprinkled throughout the entire section.

Following the Methodology section, there is a second section called "Scope of the Study". In this section, what is, and what is not, part of the study, is explicitly defined. The rationale for looking at the problem of unemployment in the first place is presented; and the reason for focusing on the Muslim minority unemployment, in specific, is briefly stated. The idea behind considering more than one individual country into is pointed out in the Methodology section; and the benefit of narrowing the research to examine two countries rather than three or more is introduced in brief. The methodology used in choosing France and the Netherlands for this research, as opposed to any other countries in the EU, is explained in great detail; with financial indicators and data about the Muslim minority populations in each country presented and compared.

In the third section, “Presentation of the Problem”, the concepts of minorities and unemployment in Europe are introduced. The problem arises from the overlap of the two concepts, a situation in which minorities suffer higher rates of unemployment than the general population. This has a dual negative impact on both the majority and minority members of the given society. Each country’s approach to integration, therefore, has an affect on the levels of unemployment among their minority population. Unemployment amongst the Muslim minority has a correlation increasing instability in minority-majority relations and the global economic crisis adds additional pressure to countries’ budgets and unemployment policies and compels urgent reform. Previous solutions made and implemented by both countries have failed to fully solve the problem; it is necessary to find new public policies using comparison and contrast between existing French and Dutch unemployment policies. Conclusions can be drawn from the result.

These sections lead to the crucial step: the formal definition of the *variables* this research focuses on, and of the *hypotheses* that orients the rest of the paper and is tested by the comparative analysis.

In the final section, aptly named “Structure of the Study”, the main chapters of the study, including a brief description of the contents of each section, are introduced. It provides an overview of the approach taken in this research to finding answers to the research questions above, following a step-by-step approach: general overview of unemployment in the EU, including general factors which affect unemployment, and specifically unemployment amongst the Muslim minority group; then a look at France, the history of Muslim minorities in France, unemployment in France, general and targeted public unemployment policies and their impact on the Muslim minority; followed by the same topics covered for the Netherlands; and finishing with a comparison and contrast between the two countries, and conclusions. This section contains introductions to the sub-sections and a general overview. More details can be found in the sub-sections in the body of the study.

Methodology used

This study's goal is to gain a better view of one of the main problems facing contemporary Europe: the social and economic integration of ethnic minorities from non-European backgrounds. These minorities face a wide range of problems and their integration into the "host" society is still considered imperfect, featuring prominently in the political discussions of those countries; while the reasons for this state of affairs are widely debated. This study focuses on the Muslim minorities, as they are the most numerous as a proportion of the total minority group, and their religion is often singled out in political discourse as a factor of "foreignness", an obstacle to harmonious integration or assimilation. Among the various issues facing both the majority and minority groups, this research singles out one of the major problems of contemporary European societies: unemployment, as minorities suffer disproportionately from it.

The method selected to investigate unemployment among Muslim minorities is a comparative one, between two Western European countries with important Muslim communities: France and the Netherlands. The theoretical framework behind this choice in methodology, and the reasons for choosing those countries are presented in the next two subsections.

Theoretical framework

This study uses the comparative analysis method, which is among the most ancient tools of social sciences (Azarian, 2011). This method focuses on analyzing and explaining, both similarities and differences, between two or more distinct actors faced with a similar problem. Employing this method, social scientists can understand consequences of distinct public choices when societies are confronted with similar problems; they can also test hypotheses regarding the origins, or the main factors of the problematic situations themselves. When John Stuart Mill first described a possible comparative analysis in the 19th century, he identified two main laws of comparison that

allow the researcher to conclude general facts from comparison of two distinct social situations.

First is the law of agreement, or similarity: “If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstances in which alone all the instances agree, is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon.”

The reverse law is the law of difference: “If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon.” (Mill, in Etzioni, 1970).

Two centuries later, though the complexity of observed phenomena has been greatly augmented, these laws remain valid, as laws of logic that bind research. Variables are found, that may or may not correlate with a phenomenon to be studied. Through comparison of the situations, in this case, two countries, where these variables may take one form or the other, the researcher may infer a link of causality between them.

To be more specific, this research examines the levels of unemployment among Muslim minorities in France, and then the same levels in the Netherlands. Analysis of only one of the variables, for example, France, would result in certain data as to the increase or decrease in unemployment amongst the French Muslim minority group in relation to a particular public policy. Using public policy theory and some standard-accepted benchmarks for what constitutes an average, sub-average or above-average result, it is possible to determine whether the policy is successful or not; this is, however, a somewhat arbitrary assessment. On the other hand, when comparing France and the Netherlands, even while it is not possible to directly compare the two countries’ policies, (as rarely are two policies identical, nor are the macroeconomic and social indicators that

affect these policies the same in France or the Netherlands), it is possible to look at the results of each country's policy on that country's level of Muslim minority unemployment and draw comparative conclusions.

To illustrate, take a French policy X relating to education, which corresponds to a 3% decrease in unemployment among the target minority group three years later (the time it would take for the policy to have measurable affects as it is the time that the targets of the policy take to finish high school, for example); and Dutch policy Y, also relating to education (though it does not necessarily matter), which corresponds to a 2% increase in unemployment among the target minority group the following year (for example, a 1-year training program aimed only at Muslim minority youth that further stigmatizes them, while not giving them significantly improved job skills). While it would require a detailed policy analysis for both policies based on benchmarks and other relevant socio-political and economic factors to determine the success or failure and reasons for either, the comparison model allows for the following relative conclusions to be drawn: the French policy X better addressed the Muslim minority unemployment problem than the Dutch policy Y, as shown by the significantly higher decrease in unemployment; the policy X resulted in a decrease in unemployment, while policy Y resulted in an increase in unemployment. It is also, then, possible to make some hypotheses about the relative effectiveness of unemployment policies targeted at education in France versus the Netherlands, and then test the hypotheses.

Scope of the study

Unemployment is a problem that also plagues nations with highly developed economies, such as Western European nations, as they move away from labour-intensive industries, replacing man-hours with machinery. Within the European Union, unemployment rates differ between countries along a geographical North-South and East-West divide, with rates higher in the South and East than those of the North and West.

Shared by all the member states, however, is the fact that unemployment rates among youth and minorities tend to be higher (in some cases much higher) than the unemployment statistics of the general population. When public policies are developed to try and reduce unemployment, these two subgroups need to be considered, as the problem is even more pronounced with them.

This raises the question: 'Who are those minorities?' The nations of Northern and Western Europe also share a common history of immigration. These nations' very prosperity, and their past need for a cheap workforce, brought immigrants to their territories. Those immigrants, most from non-European backgrounds, often Muslims, stayed and built lives in these countries. They married and had children in their new nations. These children have long grown up, but still they belong to a specific sociological category of minorities, and are not fully viewed as Europeans. This study focuses on those Muslim minorities, be they the immigrants themselves, or their children.

Having selected the high unemployment second subgroup – minorities – the next step is to determine which country, or countries, to focus on. While it is possible to evaluate the public policies in a certain area, in this case unemployment, in a particular country; a comparative approach can show the relative strengths and weakness of a particular country's policies. When taking more than two countries' policies into consideration, the factors that influence the effectiveness of a particular policy or its impact on the affected target group, increase exponentially, and more complex and dynamic models are necessary. For this reason, a comparison between two European countries would be ideal for demonstrating relative success and impact of their policies on the problem of minority unemployment, due to its simplicity and clarity. When selecting the two countries to be used in this analysis, the issues of size and population, economic health, and specific makeup of immigrant population are taken into consideration.

When discussing any public policy on unemployment, and its impact, an obvious

factor is the size of the country in terms of GDP and population. This is because the impact of a policy depends on the number of people the policy will affect and, often, depends also upon the amount of funds used to implement this policy compared to overall macroeconomic indicators such as GDP. An example that can help to clarify this point is: an unemployment policy targeted at students and recent graduates. The effect of this policy depends, of course, on the ratio of students/recent graduates to the whole population, and the proportion of money/resources allotted by this policy; or, more concretely, the results of such a policy with the funds of 500,000 Euros on the students/graduates of Estonia, with 68,000 students and 11,000 new graduates (5% and .8% of a total population of 1.3 million)[1], with a national GDP of 14 billion (or 10,800 Euros per capita); compared to a similar policy with the same funding (500,000 Euros) on the students/graduates of Germany, with its 2.4 million students and 500,000 new graduates (3% and 0.6% of total population of 81 million), with a national GDP of 2.4 billion Euros (or 29,700 Euros per capita)[2].

These two public policies, while, in principle, similar or identical, would obviously have vastly different results and impact, regardless of other general factors that affect the efficiency and effectiveness of public policies. For this reason, in order to have a relevant contrast when examining the impact of two countries' policies on the minority populations, and thereby be able to examine in which aspects size is a factor and those aspects where size is not relevant; one large country and one smaller one (large and small as defined by population size and GDP) are chosen for this study.

As countries experience economic up- and downturns, unemployment rates fluctuate as well. The economic crisis of 2008 had the result that unemployment went up across the board in all the member states. Though the extent to which the individual countries were affected, and the speed of their recovery, differs; it is impossible to separate macroeconomics from unemployment considerations. The purpose of the

1 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Tertiary_education_statistics
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_past_and_future_GDP_%28nominal%29

analysis in this research is to try and determine which country's public policies are more or less effective in managing the rates of unemployment amongst the minority population.

When a particular country's economy is in crisis or fluctuating wildly, unemployment is more directly impacted by the current economic environment, than by the effectiveness of any public policies targeted at the problem. As a result, it becomes more difficult to effectively isolate the policy effectiveness in terms of the minority population. Complete isolation of this variable is impossible; however, by choosing countries that currently have good economic conditions that are relatively stable, partial variable isolation is more possible. In other words, by choosing countries with strong economic performance (predominantly Northern and Western European countries), the effects of the policies, rather than of the macroeconomic conditions, will be stronger and more visible. After determining both economic health and stability and population/GDP size[3], as a selection criteria, the following EU countries remain as candidates for this study: Large (> 45 million population) – Germany, France, UK; Small: Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Luxemburg.

Another factor in the selection of countries for this research would then be the size of the minority populations in each of the prospective countries to determine those with the largest minority groups, and therefore experiencing the greatest impact of the problems associated with unemployment amongst minority groups. Among the large countries, the country with the largest minority population (as a percentage of the total population) is Germany (5.6%), followed by France (3.8%) and the UK (3.9%). The largest minority populations in the smaller countries are (in order of percentage of total population): Luxemburg (5.9%), Denmark (3.9%) Sweden (3.5%), Belgium (3.1%), the Netherlands (2.1%) and Finland (1.9%).[4]

3 In such developed European countries of similar wealth, population and GDP correlate.
4 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/product?code=migr_pop1ctz&language=en&mode=view

The next step is to look among the selected group at total unemployment levels within each country. Countries with the highest levels of overall unemployment for the whole population would benefit the most (or have the most to lose) by the effectiveness and efficiency of any public policies designed to reduce unemployment. Again, following the large/small country division, in order of highest levels of unemployment to lowest, there is the following: Large – France (10.1%), UK (8.1), Germany (5.6); Small – Sweden, Denmark (7.8%), Finland (7.6%), Belgium (7.2%), Luxemburg (5.4%), and the Netherlands (5.1%).[5] France and Netherlands stand at the opposite ends of the spectrum here, making a comparison of the effectiveness of their policies easier.

The last, and far from the least, factor is the country's approach to integration. As is detailed later, the two main principles in regards to a country's relation to its minority groups are: the assimilative and multicultural approaches. The first one means "assimilation to a pre-existing unified social order with a homogenous culture and set of values. Integration is perceived as a one-way process, placing the onus for change solely on migrants. They are expected to undergo a unilateral process of change, particularly in the public sphere, so that they can fit into a given order" (Rudiger & Spencer, 2003).

A multicultural policy, on the other hand, aims to "include" people as they are, rather than assimilating them into the dominant culture. "Inclusion is a minimalist approach to integration, but does not require much more efforts than for mainstream policy concerns, since policymakers use it to refer to all social groups, not just migrants and minorities. Social inclusion is a stated policy goal for governments throughout the EU6, directed at eliminating the exclusion of all disadvantaged groups to enable everyone "to have access to, use, participate in, benefit from and feel a sense of belonging to a given area of society." (Castles & al., 2001)

5http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics

6 Council of the European Union, 15223/01, Joint Report on Social Inclusion, Part II – The Member States (Brussels, 12 December 2001).

While integration is impossible without cooperation of, and by, the minority groups, it "requires meaningful interaction between migrants and the receiving society, which means integration must be conceived as a two-way process" (Rudiger & Spencer, 2003). For the purposes of comparing and contrasting these two different approaches to integration, one country from each style (or more specifically one country from the assimilation approach (France) and one country that HAD a multicultural approach, but transitioned to an assimilation approach (the Netherlands)), are selected in order to determine if, and to what extent, the nature of the integration policies affects the level of unemployment for the Muslim minority groups.

Using these indicators, starting with the most important: population size/GDP, a cut-off of 45 million people has been selected due to the fact that the largest gap between the listed countries was between the UK (with 62 million) and the Netherlands (with 16 million). As the difference between these countries proved to be the most significant one, the cut-off should be in the middle of these two figures; thus, the midpoint was selected. For the large countries, the top two candidates, in order from greatest to least, (eliminating the bottom third) are: Germany and France; for the smaller countries, the top four candidates in the same order are (also eliminating the bottom third): the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and Denmark.

There are additional justifications for eliminating the UK, Finland and Luxembourg as well. First, the UK is known for the multicultural nature of its society. While there are identifiable minority groups, the "minorities", e.g. non-ethnic English, Welsh or Scottish, actually make up the majority. Intermarriage, integration, third and fourth generation offspring of mixed immigration ancestry, all serve to render a clear definition of minorities unattainable. While the numbers for minority as a percentage of total population are high, shared with Denmark and trailing just behind Luxembourg, the number of actual minorities, and in specific, Muslim minorities is actually much higher; but difficult to identify as part of the minority having intermarried and integrated into the society to such an extent that distinguishing them as a separate group is impossible.

Finland, by contrast, has the lowest rate of minority population. This, in combination with a relatively low rate of unemployment, second only to the Netherlands, qualifies it for elimination from consideration as having a relatively low levels of both GDP/population, low levels of overall employment and, in specific low levels of minority members; the measurable impact of public policies to reduce unemployment in this minority group would prove negligible.

Finally, Luxembourg can also be excluded from consideration due to the same first two selection criteria: GDP/population and overall levels of employment. The population in Luxemburg is the smallest and the unemployment rate is the lowest, second only to the Netherlands. While it does have the highest level of minority members as a percentage of its total population, this can be explained by two factors. First, Luxemburg is the smallest country amongst the candidate nations, and as such, has the smallest denominator for the calculations of minorities *as a percentage of the total population*. Secondly, the extremely restrictive nature of immigration policies and employment visas, as well as the societal view of integration (as in Luxemburgians do not integrate with outsiders) results in the continuous separation and isolation of the minorities in Luxemburg, as well as the almost permanent status as minority for all migrants to the country.

Next, now that some countries have been eliminated, it is important to examine those remaining for suitability. When looking at the percentage of the total taken up by the minority population, for compare and contrast purposes, an example of a country with a higher numbers of minority as a percentage of total population, contrasted with one with a relatively lower number, would be desirable. As both Germany and France have relatively high numbers of minority populations (Germany coming just beneath Luxembourg at 5.6%, and France just underneath the UK and Denmark at 3.8%), then the country chosen with the smaller total population, would, logically, be one of the ones with the lowest percentage of minority members as a percentage of the total population.

As there are only two countries in the running from the large group, neither are eliminated at this stage. From the smaller sized countries that remain under consideration, those with the lowest numbers of minority population are (in order from lowest to highest): the Netherlands (2.1%), Belgium (3.1%), Sweden (3.5 %) and Denmark (3.9%). The countries left are (in order of both population size large to small, and size of minority population from large to small for the larger countries, and small to large for the smaller countries): Large – Germany and France; Small – the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and Denmark.

The third consideration in candidate countries for this study is the philosophy of integration that they employ. Contrasting countries, or countries having different integration philosophies, allow for comparison of policies based on opposite points of view. Germany and France have opposite approaches in terms of immigration and integration policies: Germany is resistant to naturalization and has complicated procedures for citizenship, referred to as an exclusionary approach (Costoiu, 2008); while Francethe dominant view in French society holds that any person residing in France or its colonies and participating in society, such as working, paying taxes, voting, etc., should become citizens if they so desire. However, they share the common characteristic of one-way integration, with the onus of change on the migrants. In Germany, this view is due to importance of the "blood ties", which serves to make anyone not genetically or ethnically German, inferior to those who are German (Costoiu 2008); France's approach is based on the idea of liberty, fraternity and equality, those famous values residual of the French Revolution.

Evaluating the smaller countries for their integration philosophies, it can be seen that Sweden and Denmark are both assimilationist; the Netherlands has long been multiculturalist, before starting to switch towards assimilationism; and Belgium is a combination of both). As there is no difference in the one-way integration approach taken in Germany and France, a country with a multiculturalist approach should be selected from among the small countries. Only the Netherlands and Belgium share this approach, though Belgium combines both approaches along the Wallon/Flemish divide. Before

eliminating Sweden and Denmark however, as integration approach is a somewhat arbitrary factor (and difficult to measure in way suitable for ranking or numeric comparison), it is perhaps helpful to look at the overall unemployment statistics.

As with the other selection criteria, examples from the highest and lowest unemployment statistics yield the best possibilities for comparison and contrast. The country with the highest levels of unemployment is France; the country with the lowest is the Netherlands. Please note that this is in absolute terms from the original list with all the candidate countries and not merely the ranking according to the filtered and pre-selected list. In order from highest to lowest levels of unemployment from the current selection is: France (10.1%), Sweden (7.8%), Denmark (7.8%), Belgium (7.2%), Germany (5.6%) and the Netherlands (5.1%). Continuing with the large/small country divide, the resulting pairs would be either a) Germany and one of the following: Sweden, Denmark and Belgium, or b) France and the Netherlands.

Taking a closer look at the make-up of the minority population in Germany, it is predominantly Turkish (between 3.5 and 4 million people), with the next major minority group, Russians, numbering only 600,000 people; while in France, the minority group is more diverse and includes both North African (mostly Algerian and Moroccan), Turkish and Sub-Saharan African groups. When analyzing the impact of public policies on the minority group of a particular country, the fact that the minority group is extremely mono-ethnic could lead to skewed conclusions; for example, that a particular trend or impact of a certain policy applies to the minority population and can be expanded to theories about strengths and weaknesses of the policy; when actually, it is a trend or impact that only applies to the Turkish population of the minority, making it difficult to draw any conclusions or compare minority groups across countries.

While it is possible to select a subgroup of the minority population as has been done in this research: Muslim minorities, as this group is clearly definable, consists of different but related groups, and is comparable across borders; and it is also possible to

identify the Turkish minority subset of the minority group for the same reasons; it is not possible to compare predominantly Turkish minorities in one country with a group of Muslim minorities in another country as they are not equivalent: apples and oranges. In order to conduct this analysis, without distorting the factors that impact the Muslim minority group, it is necessary to select two countries with minority groups that share a similar make-up and variety.

Before moving on, it would be relevant to also look at the three smaller countries that Germany could be compared and contrasted with. In terms of total population, Belgium is the largest, followed by Sweden and Denmark. When comparing their overall unemployment statistics, Belgium has the lowest, followed by Denmark, then Sweden. The percentage that the Muslim minority takes of the total population leads with Denmark, followed by Sweden and then Belgium. Combining these statistics produces no clear leader in terms of the country that would produce the best results for comparison and contrast with Germany, making a selection arbitrary at best. In addition to these factors, however unrelated, yet important, with the exception of Belgium (French and Flemish/Dutch), the Swedish and Danish languages pose additional complications for this researcher.

If Germany is eliminated because of the make-up of its minority population, as well as the unsuitability of choosing one of the three potential paired countries; it still remains to run the same suitability check for the remaining options: France and the Netherlands. Returning to the initial criteria: population, it can be seen that the population of France is nearly ten times that of the Netherlands, making a comparison between the unemployment policies of the Muslim minority in both a large and relatively small country possible. The next indicator, unemployment statistics for the general population, reveals an equally satisfying result: France has the highest levels of unemployment amongst the candidate states, while the Netherlands has the lowest. Again, the possibility for comparison and contrast is clear. Continuing this check for suitability, the numbers for the minority percentage of the total population yields acceptably different

percentages, with France relatively high at 3.8%, just behind the UK and Denmark, and the Netherlands relatively low at 2.1%, just above Finland. After running these checks, and considering that the two countries also have different approaches to integration, they have been selected as the ideal pair for further analysis in this research.

Presentation of the problem

This research covers the topics of minorities and unemployment. The problem arises from the overlap of these two concepts: a situation in which minorities suffer higher rates of unemployment than the general population. This has a dual negative impact on both the majority and minority members of the given society: costs of unemployment are borne but the whole society; and this serves to further impact the minority unemployment negatively, which begins the whole cycle again. Each country's approach to integration, therefore, has an affect on the levels of unemployment among their minority population. Whether the cause or effect of, it cannot be argued that unemployment amongst the Muslim minority has a correlation to significant negative political and social media events and increasing instability in minority-majority relations. In addition, the global economic crisis adds additional pressure to countries' budgets and unemployment policies and compels urgent reform. As previous solutions, in the form of public policies, made and implemented by both countries have failed to fully solve the problem; and various factors are increasing the urgency for a solution, it becomes necessary to find new public policies. In order to do this, a comparison and contrast must be made between the existing French and Dutch unemployment policies, as well as examining their success factors. Conclusions can be drawn from the result.

Brief Background of Minorities in Europe

Europe has long been a continent with large levels of migration, both within its borders, as well as beyond. The shifts of large populations from one region to the other have been due to a variety of factors ranging from natural disasters (ice ages, flooding,

drought, volcanoes, etc) to political reasons (the rise and fall of various empires, invasion by foreign tribes, alliances and more); from religious reasons (fleeing of pagans from the reach of the Roman or Byzantine empires, flight of Protestants from Catholic persecutors and vice versa, exodus to the colonies to practice religion freely) to economic ones (immigration along trade routes, setting up ports and colonies in foreign lands, emigration due to famine or better prospects, migration between colonies and their mother countries for a variety of reasons). As a result, there have always been minority groups living in each European country. Sometimes these groups are concentrated in ghettos (like as is the case with Armenians, Jewish communities, and others); other times these groups are integrated and scattered across the majority population, integrating and inter-marrying. There are few Europeans who can claim to be 100% any particular nationality or ethnic background.

Definition of Unemployment

There is an equally long history of trade in Europe and employment records back to Greek and Roman times. There have been periods of economic prosperity as well as recessions and crises. These have been localized as well as pan-European. With economic prosperity come increased levels of trade and numbers of jobs. In times of financial difficulties, however, there is less to eat and less to do. The labour market has also been organized in a variety of ways including everything from slaves and indentured servants to guilds, knights and lords and their peasants, and incorporation and employment contracts.

Unemployment *is a situation that exists when a group of the population who wants to and is able to work, are not able to find jobs*. It is important to note, however, that while this is the general definition of unemployment; there are different systems in different countries, defining unemployment differently. Also, within a country, there is an advantage to calculating unemployment rates in slightly different ways depending on whether the people or person doing the calculating holds a leftist or rightist view. That is

why, sometimes, it is not possible to get exact numbers for unemployment due to the differences in calculation systems.

Unemployment occurs when a country or region is going through an economic downturn. There are less money and goods circulating in the economy, so fewer people are needed to produce the goods and less money is available to pay employees; which leads to higher levels of unemployment and lower levels of income and disposable income amongst the population; which, in turn, results in less money and goods circulating in the economy—a so called vicious cycle. The reverse is also true: when more money and goods are circulating in the economy, more people are employed to produce an increasing number of goods and enough money is available to pay their salaries; which they, then, in turn, use to purchase more goods, injecting more money into the economy. This is often referred to in macroeconomic theory as a virtuous cycle.

Where Minorities and Unemployment Overlap in the EU

The context of this research is to examine where these two topics: migration and unemployment, overlap; specifically, in the modern economy. As the individual European countries continue their process of convergence into a unified entity: the European Union, their individual economies become more and more intertwined and interdependent. It is currently possible to speak of the European market and to discuss European Economics as a whole. This does not discount, however, that there are significant differences between the financial situations and production characteristics between the individual members states. In general, the Northern countries are still relatively wealthier than their Southern cousins; and Western Europe, which has enjoyed a free market economy for decades longer than those countries belonging to the former East Bloc, tends to exhibit the mature and stable characteristics shared by more developed economies. Within these areas of relatively similar wealth, however, there are still variations in GDP levels and unemployment statistics, among other economic factors.

Minorities and Unemployment in France and the Netherlands

France and the Netherlands, though similar in their free market economies and developed labour market, exhibit differences in their economic cycles. Both countries have been members of the European Union (formerly the European Community) for the same amount of time; both have had to recover from the financial aftermath of the two World Wars; both have had colonies and both have significant levels of immigration. While similar, there are some differences in the make up and size of their Muslim minority groups, as well as slight discrepancies between their unemployment levels over the past decade. They also demonstrate significantly different philosophies and approaches to dealing with the minority groups and making policies to combat unemployment.

In France, attempts made in the 1990s, to help reduce levels of unemployment in underprivileged neighborhoods (the residents of which are primarily immigrants or Muslim minorities) by offering special job training and trying to attract businesses to the area, were largely unsuccessful, having negligible affect on the levels of unemployment in this minority group. As a result, the nature of France's approach and policies have transitioned from proactive empowerment, to a more apathetic "temporary fix" mentality with neighborhood beautification programs and subsidized jobs for local youth in schools or non-profits.

In the Netherlands, there has been a similar decrease in enthusiasm from the time of multiculturalism to the extreme anti-immigration (and inherent anti-Muslim) vision of the Rita Verdonk era. Dutch society was extremely divided on this issue, and it led to such a crisis, that at one point, the Parliament was dissolved as a result. Nevertheless, assimilationism has now gained the upper hand in the Dutch public debate about integration, and most recent policies reflect that choice.

This leaves minority members of both countries little choice: they must either assimilate into the majority culture, which may go against many of their cultural beliefs, norms and values; or risk the social, political and economic repercussions of maintaining their own identity while being a member of the minority group. There is no middle ground, where, while retaining their own identity, minority members participate in the general society and actively contribute to political and economic life of the country where they live. This is a difficult choice for the minority member to make, and one that is not always reciprocated by the society they choose to join.

Increasing Urgency to Solve Minority Unemployment Problem in France and the Netherlands

For both countries, France and the Netherlands, for a variety of socio-political and economic reasons, the "problem" of the Muslim minority is increasingly taking center stage in: a) political platforms (the Netherlands: the extreme anti-immigrant, anti-minority politician Geert Wilders and his popular political party PVV, Party for Freedom); b) media (news coverage of the "Muslim issue" has skyrocketed), and c) social debate. National events (France: the 2005 riots in disadvantaged neighborhoods with high densities of these Muslim minority groups) and high-profile crimes (the Netherlands: the 2002 murder of Pim Fortuyn, 2004 murder of Theo van Gogh) have received much attention in past years, bringing the topic to the attention of the general population, and making finding solutions more urgent.

At the same time, fiscal pressures brought on by the 2008 economic crisis, which caused widespread unemployment, serve to highlight the issue in public policy; as well as bring added attention to the higher levels of unemployment among the Muslim minority. Besides reforms in public policy about unemployment, both countries are forced to make cutbacks and spend less on other policy areas. In an environment of economic contraction, a scapegoat is often selected to blame for "all the problems", and the Muslim minority is an easy target. These factors have served to polarize anti-Muslim sentiment,

leading to an increase in crimes against Muslims in both countries, and have posed a significant threat to integration efforts, The problem is thus one that affects both sides: the Muslim minority, and the French and Dutch majority, respectively.

Previous French and Dutch Public Policy Attempts to Solve Muslim Minority Unemployment Have Failed

France and the Netherlands have both made previous attempts to solve the dual problems of minority integration and unemployment. These efforts have not resulted in fully solving the problems and recent developments, both national and global, have served to bring the problem into crisis and back to the forefront of political agenda and public policy making. As unemployment, and its resulting impact on success of integration, and other public concerns such as crime rates, is even higher amongst this Muslim minority, finding solutions to it become important both to integration and overall unemployment.

Comparison/Contrast and Analysis of Previous Policies Necessary to Find New Solutions

There is no question that the problem in both France and the Netherlands of Muslim minority unemployment is current, significant and urgent. In order to find a solution to this problem, it is important to understand the background of the problem (e.g. the history, how the problem became a problem, the size and severity of the problem), as well as to examine previous attempts made to solve the problem. When these two factors are known, it is then possible to analyze the results of the "solutions" (in this case, public policies) in order to determine what worked, as well as what did not work. From this as a sort of "starting point", combined with theories on: public policy, integration, and employment, it is possible to draw conclusions about success factors and possible recommendations for policies that may work better in the future to solve the problem of Muslim minority unemployment in France and the Netherlands, and perhaps beyond.

Hypotheses and variables used in this study

In this section, the variables and hypotheses used in this study are presented and explained. Using the comparative analysis method elucidated above, selected variables are tested in order to determine the specific impact of certain policies on actual rates of unemployment of Muslim minorities in both France and the Netherlands. There are two kinds of variables determined: *independent* and *dependent* variables. The independent variables are not correlated directly with the public policies, and thus, the name independent; the dependent variables, on the other hand, are related to, or *dependent on* the public policies, and therefore relevant to determining the impact of the particular policy on the target group.

Below is a list of both independent and dependent variables that have been identified. The variables are then introduced and explained briefly. Also, a short statement about why they are independent as opposed to dependent, or vice versa, is given for each.

Independent variables identified:

- General approach to integration:
  - Multicultural approach
  - Assimilation approach

- General unemployment factors:
  - Macroeconomic trends (e.g. inflation/deflation, changes in GDP)
  - Production shift from agriculture to technology
  - Supply/Demand of labour
  - Labour/Contract law
  - Socio-Cultural preferences: preferring/not wanting certain jobs/industries

- Unemployment factors specific to the Muslim minority:
  - Level of education
  - Geographical location
  - Prejudice
  - Language abilities
  - Civil status
  - Cultural considerations: esp. Islamic cultural beliefs, values and norms

- Public policies on unemployment, general

- Public policies on unemployment, specific to the minority

Dependent variables identified:

- Level of unemployment among general population
- Level of unemployment among Muslim minority
- Amount and civil status of immigrants vs citizens among Muslim minority
- Amount of Muslim minority women who are employed vs unemployed

The following short paragraphs define and elabourate briefly on the variables addressed above. A short explanation of whether the variables are independent or dependent, and whether the relationship with unemployment is causal or correlative is also included. An understanding of the variables will better help to make hypotheses related to these variables, and these hypotheses are necessary in order to be able to answer the research questions.

Variables Defined

General approach to integration is a category containing two variables: Multi-

cultural approach and assimilation approach. Depending on which approach a country takes, the level of integration is impacted. Level of integration has a direct impact on unemployment levels among the Muslim minority in that low levels of integration tend to result in higher levels of unemployment; and high levels of integration result in (relatively) lower levels of unemployment. While this inverse proportion remains to be proved in this study, the causal nature of the relationship is self-explanatory.

It can, however, be argued that these two variables: general approach to integration and Muslim minority unemployment are actually correlated, rather than causal. In the Netherlands for example, there was first a multi-cultural approach, and Muslim minority unemployment was higher than that of the general population. Then, after 2004, this approach changed drastically to one of assimilation, due to a large variety of factors, one of which could have been the unemployment amongst Muslim minority. For now, the relationship of this independent variable: approach to integration, will not be defined as causal or correlative to the dependent variable: unemployment amongst Muslim minority.

General unemployment factors is a category of variables containing: macro-economic indicators, shift of production from agriculture to technology, supply and demand within the labour force, labour/contract law and socio-cultural preferences. Changes in inflation/deflation and/or increases/decreases in GDP have a causal relationship with levels of unemployment among the general population, including Muslim minority groups. As many members of this minority originally came as migrants to work in the agricultural industry, obviously the shift from production focus from agriculture to technology will have a causal effect on levels of unemployment amongst the Muslim minority, as well as any other members of the agricultural labour force. Additionally, general economic principles of supply and demand apply to the labour market: as more people enter the workforce, there is more competition for fewer jobs resulting in higher unemployment; while when

there are fewer available people in the workforce, there are more available jobs and lower unemployment. This affects the level of unemployment of the general population, as well as the Muslim minority. A country's labour/contract laws and how restrictive they are has a causal impact on readiness/willingness of employers to hire new employees and will result in restricting demand with the resulting increase in unemployment. Finally, socio-cultural preferences for certain jobs or certain industries will affect supply of workforce in those jobs or industries with the resulting impact on unemployment.

Unemployment factors specific to Muslim minority is a category of variables including: education levels, geographical location, prejudice, language levels, civil status and culture-specific considerations. These have a direct impact on Muslim minority unemployment levels, whether or not they affect general employment levels. In all cases, the relationship is causal rather than correlative, except maybe in the case of geographical location and prejudice as explained below.

The level of education a person has, has a direct impact on their employment possibility. Education levels are, on average, lower among the Muslim minority group (specifics provided in the body of this work) and have a causal relationship with higher levels of unemployment among this group. Geographical location, in relation to the agriculture/technology shift that affects the general population, has a specific relationship with Muslim minority unemployment levels. Whether this relationship is causal or correlative can be argued, as the agricultural location and its correlation with higher numbers of Muslim minority residents might be the cause of the higher rates of unemployment of Muslim minority members. Similarly, prejudice against members of the minority can cause higher levels of unemployment; while simultaneously, higher levels among the Muslim minority can cause an increase in prejudice against this group as the majority group deals with the economic and socio-political consequences of the high unemployment.

Language abilities have proven related to ability to find work, and is often a causal factor: when a member of the Muslim minority cannot speak the language of the majority, this often leads to difficulties in finding work and higher levels of unemployment. Civil status, as a "guest worker", legal alien, resident or citizen can all determine whether and in what capacity someone can work, and therefore the civil status held by members of the minority group has a causal relationship with levels of unemployment for that group. Other minority group-specific cultural considerations such as the role of women in the workplace have a causal impact on the levels of unemployment among those affected by these considerations.

Public policies on unemployment are designed to reduce levels of employment amongst the general population. To what extent they do this, or fail to do this, depends on a variety of factors. However, the policies themselves are independent of these factors and the relationship between this variable and the dependent variable: Muslim minority unemployment is causal. Whether the causal relationship increases or decreases this dependent variable, depends on the policy and other factors.

Public policies on unemployment, specific to the minority, like general unemployment public policies, are both independent and causal in nature. The reason for this, and explanation of it, are identical to that of general public policies above.

Level of unemployment among general population in this study is a dependent variable. Depending on the non-minority specific independent variables above and whether the relationship is causal or correlative, the level of unemployment among the general population will increase or decrease (or, in some rare cases, remain the same).

L**evel of unemployment among Muslim minority**, in this study is a dependent

variable. Depending on the independent variables above and whether the relationship is causal or correlative, the level of unemployment among the Muslim minority population will increase or decrease (or, in some rare cases, remain the same).

Amount and civil status of immigrants vs citizens among Muslim minority is a dependent variable in this study and depends on the independent variable: unemployment factors specific to Muslim minority, specifically: civil status.

Amount of Muslim minority women who are employed vs. unemployed is a dependent variable in this study and depends on the independent variables: public policies on employment, and Unemployment factors specific to Muslim minority group, especially Cultural considerations.

After defining the relevant variables, it is now possible to make several hypotheses using these variables. The hypotheses are made in the context of trying to find answers to the research questions. If the research question is, for example: 'Which general approach to integration seems to have a higher success rate, at least in terms of unemployment indicators?', a relevant hypothesis could be: the multicultural approach taken by the Dutch integration policy prior to 2004 is more successful than the assimilationist approach used by the French integration policy in terms of producing significantly lower rates of Muslim minority unemployment in the Netherlands after implementation of integration policies using this approach; compared to no-effect or higher relative rates of unemployment among the same minority in France using the other approach. This hypothesis makes use of both independent and dependent variables to produce a possible answer to the research question that can then, in turn, be tested and proved true or false. Depending on this result, the final conclusions can be drawn.

Hypotheses Presented

Hypotheses relative to the independent and dependent variables:

- **Hypothesis 1:** Muslim minorities suffer disproportionately from unemployment as a result of failure of integration approach

- **Hypothesis 2:** Assimilation approach is more successful than multi-cultural approach in promoting integration, thereby lowering unemployment amongst Muslim minority members

- **Hypothesis 3:** Policies aimed specifically at minorities (as in NL) are more successful than policies resulting from official equality before the law (as in Fr)

- **Hypothesis 4:** Policies aimed at education and skills development have greater impact on Muslim minority unemployment than policies promoting affirmative action in the workplace (in both countries)

- **Hypothesis 5:** Policies aimed at promoting entrepreneurship or self-employment are more effective at reducing unemployment for members of the Muslim minority than policies designed to help with skills training or job-seeking (in both countries)

Structure of the study

This research is structured according to the principles of comparative analysis: after studying the variables determined above in each of the two countries individually, a comparison is made of the problems dealt with and policies developed, in order to test the hypotheses. As a preamble to that study, there is a review of the current unemployment

situation in the European Union, especially among minorities, and of the main factors of unemployment that have been identified. Concluding the preamble, presentation of the situation in both countries, and the comparative analysis section; conclusions and recommendations are made.

The following is an overview of the content of each of the major sections of this research. First, an overview is given of general unemployment in the European Union, including the subgroups that have the highest levels of unemployment. Some background is given about general factors affecting unemployment, and then a discussion ensues about Muslim minority specific factors. This is done in order to later be able distinguish between the global causes of unemployment and the specific impact of certain unemployment policies on the Muslim minority.

Zooming in to the specific topic of this research, the history, background and current situation of Muslim minorities in France are discussed, as well as general unemployment statistics in France, and unemployment trends specific to the Muslim minority. This is followed by the presentation of public policies France has implemented to try and solve the problem of unemployment; and an analysis of the impact of these policies on the Muslim minority group.

After looking at the situation in France, attention is turned to the Netherlands. The same topics are discussed in the Dutch section: history, background and current situation of Muslim minorities in the Netherlands; general Dutch unemployment statistics and unemployment trends specific to the Dutch Muslim minority group; Dutch public policies dealing with unemployment and the impact of these policies on the minority study group.

When France and the Netherlands' Muslim minorities, unemployment facts, public policies and impact of these policies on the minority have been completely presented; there follows a section that compares and contrasts the situation in the two countries, their policies and the results. This leads to the final section which includes conclusions

based on this analysis and introduction of suggested policies for further improvement of the Franco-Dutch Muslim minority unemployment problem.

Unemployment in the European Union

One of the main reasons that the founding members states of today's European Union first went about forming the European Coal and Steel Community, the predecessor of the EU, was for economic and political stability. Following the Second World War, Europe found herself in a period of high inflation, high unemployment and economic depression. In order to try and climb out of this difficult situation, shared by most of the European continent, it was decided to cooperate in key industries in order to increase the shared wealth and decrease the chances of political tensions leading to another disastrous war. The ECSC was formed and the EC, followed finally by today's EU, have always had economic stability and creation of shared wealth at the heart of their existence.

The continued existence and growing convergence of the EU, is, in large part, due to the fact that it does contribute to economic stability and to increasing the financial wealth of its member states. It collects information and money, makes policies, distributes funds and runs projects; all with the goal of improving various financial indicators from GDP to low levels of unemployment. Many of the economic plans and policies of the EU are directed towards reducing levels of unemployment, especially in countries where the unemployment is significantly higher than the EU average. One such policy, geared specifically towards employment and workers, is the Free Movement of Workers[7]

Article 45 TFEU, which regulates the issue of mobility, is considered to be one of the most important rights of EU citizens. It is a policy chapter of the *acquis communautaire* of the European Union, and is part of the free movement of persons and

7 "The concept of a European labour market is underpinned by a right of workers to full mobility and, in the European Union (EU), this right is now extended to cover the movement of workers between Member States. Free Movement of Workers was guaranteed to EU nationals by the Treaty of Rome and was regulated by Regulation 1612/68." Source: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/dictionary6.htm

the four economic freedoms: free movement of goods, services, labour and capital.[8] The idea is that with this guarantee for free movement, economic recovery and stability is easier and quicker, and that this will help to combat regional unemployment: eg. when there is high unemployment in one area of the European Union, European workers can move to a place where employment is easier and/or where wages are higher, and in this way, lower unemployment across the Union.

Unemployment trends

At the beginning of 2000, just under 20 million people in the EU-27 were qualified as unemployed. This equaled a European wide unemployment average just under 9%. It fell even lower the following year (8.5%) and then rose to just over 9% in 2002. Between 2002 and 2005, it remained relatively stable. After 2005, it steadily declined to 6.7% in 2008. This slow and steady decline was interrupted with the economic crisis, leading to an increase in unemployment to 9.7% in 2010 and 2011, the highest rate since 2000.[9]

Unemployment in the Euro area (EA-17), more or less mirrored that of the EU-27. During the period of 2000 – 2004, however, unemployment in the euro area was lower than that in the EU-27. In 2005 – 2008, the opposite was true: unemployment in the non-Euro member states declined more rapidly than it did in those in the Euro zone. During the crisis, unemployment increased rapidly both in the EA-17 and the EU-27; while after the crisis, in 2011, the average unemployment rate for the EA-17 was 10.2%, significantly higher than the EU-27.

To compare the unemployment trends during the past decade with the global situation, it might be interesting to note that unemployment was as low as 4% in the United States in 2000, compared to the 9% average in Europe. By 2009, however, the

8 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_of_movement_for_workers
9http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics

unemployment rate in the United States increased dramatically to the same level as in the EU, and even surpassing the EU levels at one point during the year. Later, in 2010 and 2011, the US rate dropped below the EU level again, but still remained relatively high. On the other side of the globe, in Japan, unemployment rates were much lower than in the EU (and the US) throughout the decade, without exception.

Youth unemployment trends

In general, youth experience much higher unemployment rates than the average for all ages. This reflects, in part, the difficulties young people face finding jobs. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the reason the number of unemployed persons between the ages of 15 and 24 is large is because many young people are studying full-time and are therefore neither working nor looking for a job. If they are studying full-time and/or not looking for a job, they are not part of the labour force number used as the denominator for calculating the unemployment rate. It is interesting to note however, that youth unemployment in the EU are much lower than youth unemployment rates worldwide; however, they have also risen since 2008 due to the effects of the recent crisis on the labour market.

Youth unemployment in the EU-27 was around twice as high as the rate for the total population throughout the last decade. The EU-27 youth unemployment rate was systematically higher than that of the euro area between 2000 and early 2008. Following this date, the two rates remained close until mid 2010 when the EU-27 youth unemployment rate started to increase more strongly than that of the EA-17. While youth unemployment thus increased in both areas during the crisis, the increase has been more relevant for the EU-27, despite the lower overall unemployment rate in that area. The youth unemployment rate remained characteristically low in the Netherlands between

2009 and 2011, going up from 7.7% to 8.5%, while in France, it went down but remained at very high levels, going from 23.9% to 22.7%.[10]

Male and female unemployment trends

Historically, women have been more affected by unemployment than men. In 2000, the unemployment rate for women in the EU-27 was around 10 %, while the rate for men was around 8 %. By the end of 2002, this gender gap had narrowed to around 1.3 percentage points and between 2002 and early 2007 this gap remained more or less constant. In recent years, most markedly since the first quarter of 2008, male and female unemployment rates in the EU-27 have converged and by the second quarter of 2009 the male unemployment rate was higher. The annual average unemployment rates for 2009 and 2010 were consequently slightly higher for men (9.1 % and 9.7% respectively) than for women (9.0 % and 9.6 %). In 2011 however, unemployment for males slightly declined in the EU-27, while that of women continued to increase such that the rate for males was again lower at 9.6 % than that for females (9.8 %). In the Netherlands, the gender imbalance has disappeared in the last years: in 2006, the male unemployment rate was 3.9% and the female rate 5.0%; in 2011, the rates were respectively 4.5% and 4.4%, whereas the imbalance decreased but remained substantial in France (in 2006, male unemployment rate was 8.5%, female 10.1%; in 2011, 9.2% and 10.2% respectively).[11]

General factors affecting unemployment

There are a wide variety of factors that affect unemployment. These range from macroeconomic factors and the general shift from agriculture to industry to technology;

10 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Youth_unemployment,_2011Q4_%28%25%29.png&filetimestamp=20120502094632

11 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Unemployment_rate_by_gender_and_age,_2006-2011_%28%25%29.png&filetimestamp=20120502101521

to supply and demand, in which the system of education and the number of qualified people play a role. There are also issues arising from a country's particular labour regulations and contract law, as well as socio-cultural aspects to take into consideration. While Muslim minorities face additional challenges in terms of employment, the entire labour market shares these general macroeconomic, structural and capacity issues.

Several economic up- and downturns have affected the European labour market during the past century. Most notably, after the post-war boom, European economies have exhibited high levels of unemployment since the 1970's, among other distressing econometrics, such as high inflation and low levels of national GDP. When a country's market is in a constrictive phase, the movement of goods and services around the local economy slows, GDP decreases and unemployment increases. In times of prosperity, overall unemployment rates tend to be low. It is important to note, however, that while the level of unemployment amongst the general population might be quite low, specific segments of the population might simultaneously experience increases in unemployment.

Some examples of this fall along the urban/agricultural divide. While unemployment wracks the urban centers of a country, leaving large numbers of the population (and thus a high percentage of the total population, resulting in high total unemployment rates) unemployed, those in the countryside might enjoy significantly lower levels of unemployment. In a society where the market is increasingly focused on technology and global competitiveness, the reverse might be true: the overall rate of unemployment in the country remains low, while in agricultural regions they are high. Both France and the Netherlands suffer such a divide, but in both cases, the objects of this research, the Muslim minorities, are concentrated in cities.

Other examples include different demographics such as age and gender. It is often the case in Europe and abroad that the unemployment levels of these demographic groups differ from the overall unemployment rates of the general population. Specifically youth and those individuals near retirement are affected. The younger generation lacks the

experience required by the labour market, while the older generation's skills might be not be up-to-date, and their experience may render them too expensive.

Additionally, the education system of a particular country might be inadequate to fill the market's needs. Conversely, the supply of fresh young graduates might exceed the number of positions available on the market. Both of these situations lead to higher rates of unemployment as the first case fails to produce the kinds of skills that would enable graduates to find employment; and the second case produces too many, leaving those who are not hired unemployed. The European labour market is currently suffering from both factors: the education system is often not flexible enough to respond to the rapidly changing demands of the labour market, or fails to provide the appropriate skills necessary for graduates to be successful in the marketplace; while simultaneously producing a sudden influx in the number of highly educated young professionals, with no experience and too concentrated in specific industries which are saturated and unable to absorb the new entrants to the labour market.

Each country in the European Union has its own labour and contract law, as well as those laws and regulations shared by the members of the EU. Unemployment often indirectly or directly depends on how extensive and restrictive a country's laws are. If, for example, contracts are for an unlimited period and the country's laws make it difficult to terminate employment with an employee, obviously companies will be more hesitant to hire new staff, as well as conservative with the wages offered. This is also true when the laws of the country require longer periods for employment contracts, or automatic renewal.

Another way the laws can affect unemployment are in areas such as maternity leave and retirement regulations. In countries where there is a generous maternity leave, women suffer higher levels of unemployment as employers are reluctant to hire women of childbearing age. Alternatively, when the age limit of legal retirement is raised, this can also result in higher levels of unemployment amongst this demographic group as they

do not yet qualify for pension or other government aid (meaning that they will want to work), but be too expensive, or overqualified to be attractive on the job market. In addition, a country's policies and laws relating to unemployment benefits and re-training will have an impact on unemployment levels as well, either positively or negatively.

This is the same for a particular cultural bias in terms of employment. This can be industry-specific, such as working in waste management or some service industries (though there is an excess of jobs in the field, the societal view of the work has an impact on the number of people wanting to work in the particular field) and prestigious fields like medicine and law (the supply of labour is higher regardless of demand due to the positive view held of these areas); or gender related as is the case with the lower numbers of women employed in the trucking industry or men in the nursing field.

Specific factors affecting unemployment amongst Muslim minorities

In addition to the above-related factors that affect levels of general unemployment, minorities face additional obstacles to employment, resulting in the higher levels found amongst this group. The factors that specifically affect this group are the comparatively lower levels of education, geographical location, prejudice, language, civil status, and cultural considerations. These specific obstacles to employment are not necessarily limited only to the Muslim minorities, but can be shared with other minority groups. On the other hand, these challenges are shared amongst the members of the Muslim minority group and help to explain why the levels of unemployment among their particular minority is higher than that of the general population, or even that of other minority groups.

The members of the Muslim minority group are often descended from Muslim immigrants, or themselves former immigrants. Discussed in another part of this research are the various historical reasons for their immigration, and often it was for work in the

agricultural field and/or relocate from the (former) colonies to the "mother" country for better financial prospects. Rarely were these immigrants highly-educated, nor skilled in areas other than agriculture or low-level factory jobs. Children's education levels are connected to their parents' education level; with the result that children of parents with a high level of education, themselves reach a high level of education; while children with uneducated parents, tend to also pursue lower levels of education themselves (Coulmont 2012). As the demand for higher and higher skill levels increase, unemployment amongst the unskilled and uneducated increases too.

At the time that many of these Muslim immigrants came to Europe, the demand for agricultural labour was high and they were needed to help develop their host countries agriculture. Obviously, as the immigrant labourers came to work on farms and in greenhouses, their populations tend to be more concentrated in rural areas as compared to urban centers. Recent decades, however, have shown a significant shift in the EU from agriculture and industry and technology. The number of labourers needed for working in farms and greenhouses significantly decreased, and was replaced by machines and more advanced agricultural processes. This also meant a switch of jobs from the countryside to the city centers, where the technological industry is based. For those minorities who were unable or unwilling to move to the cities, there were fewer job prospects in the towns and villages where they lived and steadily higher rates of unemployment in these areas. For the other members of the minority group who were willing to relocate to the urban centers, they often faced the dual problem of higher costs of living and lacking the qualifications for the kind of jobs available in these cities, leaving large numbers of this group unemployed as well.

Depending on where the Muslim immigrants emigrated from, there is also the possibility of language difficulties posing a threat to employment chances. While several of the immigrants from former colonies share the same mother tongue as the country to which they came; other immigrant groups speak a different language than the one spoken in their country of residence. Children of these immigrants, while having a better chance

of speaking the local language than their parents, often demonstrate grammar and language skills inferior to those of children born to native speakers. Due to the isolation that can be caused when one cannot speak the language, it can be difficult for members of these minority groups to find jobs that do not require fluency, and even more difficult still, to be hired. In some cases, in the agricultural and factory industries, language skills have lesser importance. However, as is discussed above, jobs in these industries are steadily decreasing and language skills become increasingly important in finding alternative work.

A further consideration for members of the Muslim minority groups is their particular civil status and the national labour rules in regards to this status. In Germany, for example, after WWII, labourers from Turkey were encouraged to come *en masse* to work in the German agricultural field. (8% to 10% of the German population, most of them military, so able-bodied men, had been killed or disabled, leaving a limited supply of labour for the growing demand for agriculture) (Rovan, 1999). The idea was that these Turkish workers would come, they would work in the fields as there were no German counterparts who could do it; and, after the industry had recovered and/or the next generation of German labourers had reached working age, the Turkish immigrants would return to Turkey and the German workforce would take over where they left off. For this reason, there were no integration policies for this large minority and they were not granted German passports or other benefits of citizenship as a normal immigrant would eventually come to posses.

The labourers did not leave however, and, in fact, several generations later, the Turkish minority is the largest minority in Germany. On the other hand, most of those belonging to the first and second generation have been denied the full civil status of their German native counterparts, which has implications for their ability to own companies and properties, take loans, vote, receive social welfare and be represented in the legal system.

Similar issues were, and continue to be, faced by the Muslim minority group in other European countries, including France and the Netherlands. Immigrants from Morocco, for example, are not allowed to give up their Moroccan citizenship; while countries, such as the Netherlands, do not allow their citizens to have more than one citizenship (ECRI, 2008). This poses a problem for the Moroccan immigrants to the Netherlands, as well as to their children and grandchildren. A child born to a Moroccan is automatically also a Moroccan; therefore, this limitation posed to this particular minority group continues from generation to generation.

This leads to the ridiculous reality that though you may have been born in the Netherlands and spent your whole life in the Netherlands, speaking only Dutch and living and working with other Dutch people; and though your parents might have done the same, if one of your grandparents, or great-grandparents was Moroccan, you can never formally be Dutch and enjoy the full rights and privileges of a native citizen. The French approach to citizenship is much more open, as not only every child who has at least one French parent, inherits citizenship; but every person born inside of France and still living there when they reach their 18th birthday has full right to citizenship (Bertossi, 2001).

Other problems posed by civil status include whether or not a particular member of the minority group has the right to work. The rules governing asylum seekers, for example, often prohibit the individual for seeking employment. This can be the case for a year, or even ten years, depending on the individual case. Also, there can be restrictions on a person's ability to work during various administrative processes. In the Netherlands, for example, it can take between 6 months and a year for the Immigration and Naturalization Service (*Immigratie en Naturalisatie Dienst* or IND) to make a decision about residency. During this time, the applicant must remain in the Netherlands, but is not allowed to work (ECRI, 2008). Some kinds of jobs, or even entire fields such as national defense, may be reserved for native citizens, and those with a non-citizen civil status are prohibited from working in these positions or fields.

Besides these legal and bureaucratic hurdles, Muslim minorities' job hunts are often inhibited by ethnic prejudices. Members of the majority population may share a generally held belief that members of a particular minority group are lazy or criminals or untrustworthy or stupid, among others; and based on these pre-conceptions, refuse to hire someone from this minority group. Another way in which prejudice can work against the Muslim minority group is that it may be believed that certain industries are the domain of this group and that they are barred or simply considered unsuitable for other fields of work (Vermeulen & Penninx, 2000). For example, while it may be completely acceptable for a Moroccan or Turkish minority member to work in your factory, you might have some misgivings about visiting a Moroccan or Turkish gynecologist. Conversely, it would be considered strange to go to a German owned and operated Döner stand. While these biases might find their source in some historical events or trends, they are baseless and only serve to aggravate the difficulties of employment of this minority group. Also, the prejudice usually leads to the expected result: Turkish Döner stand owners and few or no doctors from the Muslim minority groups, which serves to only continue the cycle and exacerbate the problem.

A final source of complication in employment for the Muslim minority is their own cultural norms and values. For example, while unemployment levels are higher than average amongst this group, the unemployment numbers for Muslim minority women are even higher still. This is the same for minority youth. In the case of the women, it is common in the Muslim society that women work at home rather than at jobs. Also, some cultures prefer men to be the breadwinner. In the more traditional of such societies, even if the wife has some kind of income, it should not be higher than that of her husband. Other considerations are things like if the cultural norm leans towards family businesses, where the family members are expected to contribute, whether or not they are formally employed; situations where the eldest son should have employment before successive male members of the family; sanctions against certain kinds of work such as in bars or restaurants where alcohol is served, or in butcheries where pork is processed, or with animals where contact between the person and the animal, such as a dog, as is required as

would be the case at veterinary offices or animal shelters. All of the previous cases can contribute to unemployment for various reasons and are unique to the minority group.

As has been shown, many minority specific characteristics and considerations contribute to the difficulty this group finds when trying to enter the job market and is a significant factor in the higher unemployment rates experienced by this group. Disadvantages that are a legacy from immigration continue to haunt Muslim minority members and affect their employability in today's European market. Pressures from the majority group as well as internal pressures also serve to pose problems to potential minority job seekers. In addition to the general conditions that affect unemployment globally, minority members have to contend with added obstacles to finding jobs.

France

In the following sections, this research focuses on France, and the French unemployment environment, as well as the specific situation of the French Muslim minority population. First, the history of these minorities in France is presented, and the roots of their unique problems, especially in terms of employment, are explained. Next, there is a brief general section on unemployment in France, with relevant statistics and trends. General non-ethnic factors that impact unemployment in France are introduced and briefly discussed. Immediately following this, the focus zooms in on the Muslim minorities' unemployment environment in modern day France. Next, attention is turned to general public policies made by the French government in an effort to deal with unemployment across the whole population, leading to introduction and discussion of policies more targeted towards the Muslim minority groups. Coinciding with the explanation of the public policies and their intended and unintended effects, the impact of all of these policies on the minority groups is discussed.

History of Muslim minorities in France

Of the total population of France, 1.55 million have Algerian origins, 1 million Moroccan, 350,000 Tunisian, and 200,000 sub-Saharan African.[12] In 2009, the marketing company, Solis, estimated the numbers for ethnic minorities (both immigrants and second generation French citizens) in France at 3.26 million Maghrebis – 5.23% of the total population, 1.83 million Black people (1.08 million Sub-Saharan Africans and 757,000 French from the French West Indies) – 2.94%, and 441,000 Turkish – 0.71% ("France's crisis", 2009). These high numbers can be explained by France's colonial and immigration history.

France has been a nation of immigrants for a long time, maybe more so than any

12 Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques.

other European nation. From the times of the Industrial Revolution, people have been drawn to France's industries, harbors, and agriculture; at first from Europe's less developed regions, then from France's own colonies. From the 19th century, African people from French colonies such as the Antilles or Senegal could receive citizenship if they had received a full French education, though that was a rather rare occurrence (Weil, 2005). Immigrants groups from the late 19th century/early 20th century such as Belgians, Poles, and Italians also had trouble integrating into French society, and were discriminated against; though this chapter of history has been largely forgotten in the last decades. Also, prejudice based on religious differences has been a problem faced by other minority groups in France: Polish Judaism or the specific Catholicism practiced by the Italians were viewed with as much defiance by secular Frenchmen as are today's Muslims.

At the same time, France's colonial expansion, rivaled only by England, brought it into contact with an immense variety of people, exotic goods and cultures. Today, some of the former colonies have been formally integrated into the Republic, as *Départements d'Outre-Mer* (Overseas Departments, mostly in the Caribbean islands), whose inhabitants share the same civic and political rights as people from the *métropole* (mainland France), but who still face racism when they come to live in Paris. Most of the colonies, however, achieved independence around 1960; some achieved this peacefully, some less. The most painful break was, without doubt, Algeria, which most French people regarded as an integral part of the country, even as most of its inhabitants, Muslims, were denied full citizenship (Stora, 2001). The bitterness on both sides of the war for Algerian independence has durably affected the relationship between France, or French people, and the numerous members of the Algerian immigrant community, as well as their children.

Work immigration was strongly encouraged by the government during the economic expansion in France between 1945 and 1973. However, when the economic

boom ended with the oil crisis, and unemployment grew to record heights, they (the government) repeatedly tried to reverse this immigration trend. These efforts have been largely unsuccessful: immigration has continued, mostly from Sub-Saharan Africa, and unemployment remains high amongst members of this minority group.

While the immigrant fathers of young French Muslims have often been among the first laid off from the increasingly defunct industrial jobs, their children have struggled to find their place in French society. They are citizens by birthright, but face racism and discrimination when they seek jobs. While it is possible to attain French citizenship, or to acquire it at birth, (which is a significant difference when compared to Germany, where even the German-born family members of immigrant workers have been denied citizenship), this "gift of French Nationality" often feels empty or fraudulent for those second and third generation French Africans.

More recently, increased recognition for human rights has led to the arrival of the family members of the predominantly male immigrants, through the policy of *regroupement familial* (the right to family reunification, based on the human right to a normal family life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the ECHR); leading to long-term residence and the emergence of a generation of French-born children of African, or Arab (mostly North African, or Algerian in the French context) immigrants. While their parents continue to have difficulties on the French labour market, the situation for the children of these immigrants is even worse. Not only are they facing they same challenges and obstacles to finding work, their specific situation is exacerbated by the fact that youth unemployment rates in general (not only for this minority) are higher than the average unemployment rates.

More and more, the basic tenets of the French political and social culture are at odds with the lingering consequences of this immigration. While the French welfare state

is among the most developed in Western Europe, it comes together with an unparalleled rigidity in economic structure: jobs bring with them such security that hiring is a difficult decision for every company. What this means that every perceived "defect", even imaginary ones, can bar candidates from a position. This is one of the reasons why racism is masked as the fear of inadequate qualifications, keeping the children of the *banlieues* (suburbs, the French equivalent of the American ghetto) from getting jobs.

Moreover, the official blindness to religious or ethnic differences, which stems from the culture of republican equality, leads to perverse consequences: not only are *discrimination positive* (affirmative action) programs impossible, but the official secularism increasingly bans religious practice from the workplace; widespread ignorance or even hostility towards Islam leads to practicing Muslims being *de facto* excluded from many positions, especially in the public sector, which maintains a strict policy of religious neutrality, forbidding every manifestation of faith by its employees.

Unemployment in France

Unemployment has remained a serious problem for the French economy in the past decade. Despite years of growth between 2002 and 2007, the unemployment has never dropped below 7.5%, and the years of economic crisis since 2008 have brought the unemployment rate to over 10% in the first months of 2012.[13] This is the average rate among European countries: Southern Europe has much higher numbers (unemployment is now over 24% in Spain), while the other main economic powers of the continent have rates lower than France's (Germany is at 5.6%, the United Kingdom at 8.1%).[14]

13 http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/info-rapide.asp?id=14

14 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Unemployment_rates,_seasonally_adjusted,_May_2012.png&filetimestamp=20120702084920

Non-ethnic unemployment factors in France

The French industrial sector has long been over-protected by the state through financial help, nationalization and anti-competitive legislation. Although European legislation has curbed a lot of those measures, it has had the unintended consequence that deindustrialization has taken a lot longer in France than in other similar European countries, and loss of industrial jobs is still a major factor of unemployment.

The French education system can also be held responsible for many failures in its ability to efficiently train a qualified workforce for the labour market as it currently exists in France. France has for a long time lacked an adequate technical education system, making both over- and under-qualification a problem for many intermediate positions. Much progress has been made in the last two decades regarding that problem, with the creation of many 2-year programs taking people away from poorly performing university degrees.

Unemployment amongst Muslim minorities in France

Quantifying unemployment among French minorities is made extremely difficult by the official ban on the collection of ethnicity-based or religion-based statistics in France. Although racism in the employment field is now commonly acknowledged, it remains difficult to measure the extent. The "republican" conception of integration, which presupposes the formal equality of all citizens, has inspired legal rules narrowly restricting the statistical recording of the racist incidents in terms of categories such as ethnicity. Instead, researchers can only gather data based on the geographical location of people (focusing on minority-heavy neighborhoods), or on the nationality of their parents (which allows data on second-generation minorities but not third-generation, as their

parents usually have French citizenship).

Data about the immigrants themselves, rather than their children, which, for the reasons discussed in the previous paragraph are difficult to quantify, has long shown disproportionate unemployment levels. In 1999, when the general unemployment rate in France was around 10%, it was more than double at 22%, among immigrants (EUMC, 2003). In 2009, the "Sensitive Urban Zones" (ZUS in French), had an unemployment rate over 18.6% compared to a national rate of 9.8%; for young people in those neighborhoods, the rate reached 43%, contributing to a feeling of discrimination, both racial and spatial (young people often complain that resumes with either an Arab-sounding name or an address in such a neighborhood are summarily rejected by potential employers) (Kepel, 2011).

Knowing that the children of these immigrants are facing similar employment difficulties as their parents, with the added disadvantage of belonging to that other high unemployment minority: youth; it is understandable that the unemployment rates among this group is even higher than those of their immigrant parents. A 2009 study following immigrant families over several generations (Maxwell, 2009), showed persistence of high unemployment figures among North Africans in France: up to 28%, with second-generation Muslims more affected than their parents (30% compared to 22%; but most of the parents' generation is already retired).

Some communities appear more shielded from unemployment due to more efficient solidarity networks and employment inside community-owned small businesses. That has been the case in Turkish communities in several large French cities (e.g. Lyon, Bordeaux). The rather small size of the community, compared to Algerian or Moroccan minorities, and its greater social cohesion, have preserved its members from unemployment; although jobs are mostly low-level positions in family restaurants or grocery stores. In one such community, in Bordeaux, girls are encouraged to pursue studies in business or management in order to take an important role in the family business, whereas boys are inclined to pursue longer studies and seek a job outside the community, either in France or in Turkey (Armagnague, 2008).

General public policies on unemployment in France

Unemployment has been at the center of political debate in France since the 1970s, and successive governments have tried to tackle the problem, while preserving the basic elements of the French socio-economical system, with mixed results. France built a quite generous welfare state during the years of high growth between 1945 and 1973, and state-financed unemployment provisions had always been part of it. As unemployment rose following the first oil crises of the 1970s, this feature of the welfare system became more prominent in the public debate, as millions of French workers had to resort to the state's help, and its weight on the national budget also became heavier.

The 2008 reform of unemployment support.

A vast reform of unemployment benefits and job-seeking support policies took place in France in 2008, fulfilling promises made by Nicolas Sarkozy during his campaign for the presidency the previous year. The most prominent part of the reform

was the fusion of the organization (formerly UNEDIC) responsible for allocating social benefits to unemployed people, with the agencies (formerly ANPE) charged with helping job-seekers in their attempts to find a job. The new structure, called “Pôle Emploi”, was based upon a principle of administrative clarification.

Each job-seeker would be allocated a single adviser responsible for helping him with both bureaucratic procedures and job-seeking activities: contacts with companies, trainings and seminars, etc. A part of the benefits were made conditional to the willingness of the job-seeker to accept offers from their adviser. Much criticism has been directed at the new Pôle Emploi agencies for their lack of funding and personnel, especially in neighborhoods where unemployment is especially high. Whereas the government claims an average of around 100 job seekers per adviser; in some cases, and disproportionately in minority districts, higher numbers of unemployed people seek help from an agency, and the promise of personalized help becomes hollow as each adviser has to manage the needs of up to 600 people (“Pôle Emploi au bord de l'implosion”, 2012).

The “auto-entrepreneur” status

The Law on Economic Modernization of 4 August, 2008, introduced a new form of individual entrepreneur: the auto-entrepreneur; the goal being to enhance the competitiveness of the French economy by promoting the entrepreneurial spirit. This new regime, based on drastic simplification of procedures, has already proven very popular, as more than 500,000 people registered between its introduction in January 2009 and July 2010 (Levratto & Serverin, 2011).

In 2011, the general appraisal of the policy was still positive, as the total revenue of auto-entrepreneurs reached 4,364 billion Euros, but the initial enthusiasm has now given way to a more careful approach from most observers, if not outright skepticism: almost 50% of all participants of the program declare no revenue, and 40% describe their

activity as supplementary to their main source of income (Thuillier, 2012). The main success achieved is the boost it has given to self-employment in France. There is no data showing the differentiation between Muslim minority participants in this program and non-minority participants, so it is impossible to make any analysis of the impact of this policy on the minority group. On the other hand, it can be assumed that, without any other data or information, that the impact on the minority group was the same as the impact on the general population, with some share of both the 4,364 billion Euro revenue and the 50% no revenue.

The foundations of French integration policy

France has long been considered a typical model of an *assimilationist* country: it "is based on the premise that all individuals should be assimilated into the society as citizens. Thus, the inhabitants of the state have access to citizenship and through citizenship the individual enters in a direct relation with the state which cannot be mediated by any kind of groups. Once they become citizens, all individuals have the same rights and duties and there are no policy differences that target the needs of different ethnic, racial or religious backgrounds" (Costoiu 2008). This approach is linked to the origins of the French republican idea in the revolution of 1789. The revolution aimed at abolishing all differences in legal conditions, and thus to achieve equality between all citizens, who had ceased being defined by a particular status (noble, priest, peasant), but were now, through citizenship, direct members of the national body. Many foreign revolutionaries received a French citizenship, which, at the time, was not only honorary, and this tradition lasted until the end of the 19th century.

It has, however, proven difficult to welcome economic immigrants in the same way the Garibaldi or even the Spanish Republican refugees were welcomed in 1939. The traditional French process of assimilation was political and cultural, based on the personal adhesion of the newcomer to French republican values (Weil 2004). Immigrants often shared the ideals of liberty and equality of the French revolution, but were also

prompt to turn cynical, as their parents or brothers had been witness of colonial rule and war in Algeria, or as they kept experiencing racism or discrimination in their daily lives, in the jobs or housing that they were supposed to stick to. Such disillusionment contributes to a refusal to assimilate among the now well-implanted Muslim communities; and even a return to their traditional culture and religion (Rudolph, 2006),

A symmetrical sentiment is felt by the French majority, that the Muslims have not respected their part of the deal, that they cannot be French (through citizenship) and remain foreign (in their culture). The strong opposition to what French people call *communautarisme*, or the organization of a society following ethnic or organic communities, as in the United States; has turned into fear that communities will nonetheless gather a more loyal following than the traditional republican ideal. The introduction to the next section examines how this cultural atmosphere affects policies directed at Muslim minorities.

Targeted public policies and their impact in France

The French state has long been extremely reluctant to make policies aimed at specific target groups, due to the republican tradition of equal treatment between citizens. The value of equality is at the centre of French political culture. As this is traditionally understood, equality is foremost under the law; that is, no one can expect a specific status that could not be shared with every other citizen of the Republic. As such, while it allows for legal action against many discriminations, it forbids many policies that would be targeted towards specific groups of people, even if their goal is to favor real equality, or at least fairness, in social conditions and aspirations.

Another French value that has led to conflict with efforts to improve the chances for Muslim minorities is the official *laïcité,* a French specific kind of secularism (Sengers & Sunier, 2011). Since 1905, when the traditional ties between the state and the Catholic Church were severed by law, France has officially banned religion from the public space.

This has been done in a much more persistent, if not aggressive, fashion, compared to similar countries. No outward sign of religious practice is allowed by civil servants or students of public schools, and the debate about possible accommodation with Muslim faithful has only led to further strengthening of the law in the last decade, with the adoption in 2011 of the law forbidding the full veil in every public place.

Opposite tendencies have however appeared in the last decade, as new emphasis has been put both on the struggle against discrimination in hiring and in the workplace; and on practical policies that, though ostensibly aimed at the general population, have, in actual fact, a disproportionate effect on minority populations. As a consequence, a series of policies were adopted, and are presented in the next sections.

Education policy

Education policy aimed at disadvantaged neighborhoods (heavily populated by minority groups) has produced mixed results. The ZEPs (*Zones d'Education Prioritaire*, Priority Education Zones) were created in 1981 by the new socialist government, with the ambition to reduce the cultural and economic gap between the children of the "bourgeois" and those of the popular, or migrant, backgrounds. Currently, however, there are few differences between ZEP schools and others: Classes have only 2 pupils less in ZEPs, according to critical reports (Ferhat, 2010), and the label scares many parents away towards private schools; while, at the same time, only the lure of higher pay can bring teachers to accept teaching there. Still, the cost for the state per pupil in ZEP schools is only 10% higher than in other schools, and much less than for other special programs or traditional elite public schools (Bénabou, Kramarz et Prost, 2004). The policy can therefore be described as a low-cost/low-result one.

However, one undesired side-effect of the policy can be lower levels of integration and an even higher concentration of minority groups at these schools, as many

non-minority parents choose instead to enroll their children in private schools. Another undesired effect is that the quality of education may in fact be inferior to non-ZEP schools. The reason for this is that teachers require higher salaries to work at such schools, meaning it costs more for the same quality than at another school. Furthermore, researchers have underlined that "the signaling effect of the ZEP status was negative for teachers." (Bénabou, Kramarz et Prost, 2005) The best teachers might choose to work at private schools, rather than these ZEP schools and teachers that are attracted only by the promise of more money, may not be as committed to or interested in the students' welfare and education, as a teacher who is not motivated merely by cash. The program is now widely seen as a failure, given that it "had no effect on academic achievement."[15]

The Anti-discrimination Law of 16 November 2001.

The first large government initiative aimed at the problem of discrimination against minority applicants during the hiring process was undertaken in 2001 by the socialist-led government of Lionel Jospin. They endeavored to accomplish this goal through the adoption of a new anti-discrimination law, which gave a clear legal framework to principles already present in the Human Rights Declaration and in EU legislation, but that had, until this law, little means by which it could be used by plaintiffs before French courts.

The crucial point of the law was the modification of the article #122-45 of labour law :

> "No applicant can be turned down for a job or a training period, no employee can be sanctioned, fired or directly or indirectly discriminated against, especially with

15 More precisely, according to the authors, "the ZEP "treatment" had no discernable effect on any of our four measures of students' academic achievement: obtaining at least one degree by the end of schooling, reaching the 8th or 10th grade, and success at the Baccalauréat. Perhaps most notable is the absence of impact at the lower end of the achievement distribution (exiting school without any degree), which was the intended target of the policy." (Bénabou, Kramarz et Prost, 2005)

respect to wages, training, regarding, assignment, qualification, classification, promotion, transfer, or contract renewal because of his/her origin, sex, mores, sexual preference, age, family situation, real or supposed belonging to an ethnic group, a nation or a race, his/her political opinion, trade union or mutual insurance company membership, religion, physical appearance, name or state of health or handicap, except if the doctor who carries out the annual examination, required by law, of the employees of a company, certifies unfitness for work, according to Book II of the Labour Code."[16]

The notion of indirect discrimination was thus introduced into law, grounds for discrimination were extended, and the scope of implementation was widened. The law also facilitated legal procedures by the following measures:

- Trade unions and anti-discrimination groups are now allowed to refer matters to the judge who is in charge of labour affairs (article L.122-45-1 of the Labour Code.
- Employees, who lodge complaints, or testify for victims of discrimination during legal procedures, are protected against potential sanctions of discriminatory treatments in the company (paragraph 3 of the article L.122-45 of the Labour Code).
- The burden of proof has evolved: if the complainant claims to have suffered from direct or indirect discrimination, the defendants have to prove that it was not the case (paragraph 4 of the article L.122-45 of the Labour Code).
- The powers of factory inspectors are extended: they are now allowed to check all kinds of discrimination and to get all kinds of documents or information which are likely to be in relation with it (a paragraph is added to the article L.611-9 of the

16 Text of the law accessible on the official Legifrance portal: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006072050&idArticle=LEGIARTI000006646204&dateTexte=20101107

Labour Code).

- The law bans the lists of applicants drawn up by political parties or organizations, which advocate discrimination during the elections of industrial arbitrators (L.513-3- 1 and L.513-10 and 11 of the Labour Code).

This represents much progress in the legal protections now offered to Muslim minorities (and, in fact, any minority) in the French labour market.

The FASILD and Acsé

The FASILD (*Fonds d'aide et de soutien pour l'intégration et la lutte contre les discriminations*- Help and Assistance for Integration and Against Discrimination Fund) is a long-standing French governmental agency aimed at helping immigrant workers. It was created in 1958 to organize housing and social security for Algerian workers in France. Its scope of action has changed in the decades since. As the state stopped encouraging economic immigration from the 1970s, the FAS, as it was then called, lost most of its means, and just barely managed to survive. In 2001, however, it has been revived and tasked with legal assistance of victims of work discrimination (Chevron, 2009). Therefore, if the barrier to unemployment for a particular member of the Muslim minority is an issue related to discrimination, they now access to legal help.

Since 2006, a new agency, the Acsé (*Agence nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l'égalité des chances*, the National Agency for Social Cohesion and Fairness) has taken over the previous missions of the FAS against discrimination. Its main efforts take the form of training programs, especially for language proficiency, legal help, and funding of

community-based NGOs. When a member of the Muslim minority is experiencing unemployment as a result of the language factor, this agency can act to help to reduce that and, more proactively, train the person to improve the minority member's chance of employment. Additionally, when a community-based NGO that helps in the Muslim minority community requires funding, this policy also allows for funds to be received from the Acsé.

Affirmative action

In the past 30 years, almost no policy of affirmative action has been attempted by France. In 1990, the Minister of Defense, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, implemented a policy of affirmative action in the Army, which would allow more opportunities for advancement, skills workshops, and driving license training for young French North-Africans. It was scrapped, however, when he resigned one year later for unrelated reasons, leaving not enough time to evaluate impact.[17].

More timid attempts have since occurred in the higher education sphere, to allow more immigrants' children into elite schools; but, again, they are based on neighborhoods rather than ethnicity. The Paris Political Sciences Institute (Sciences Po') started such a program in 2001, and the ESSEC business school in 2002. These initiatives have been generally lauded as successful and having a measurable positive impact on this minority group.

Nicolas Sarkozy first positioned himself as a candidate as a partisan of ethnicity-based affirmative action, before later reverting course when reaction from his right-wing electorate proved strongly negative. No initiative towards it has been taken since his election as President in 2007. So, while this policy has proved both positive and effective, there have been no similar policies constructed, nor this policy expanded, in the past five

17 http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discrimination_positive#En_France

years. It remains to be seen whether new socialist President François Hollande will continue or reverse this trend.

Initiatives from local governments and other public institutions.

Local initiatives must also follow the "republican" principle, banning affirmative action and any other policy directed at a minority group to the exclusion of any other group. As a result, most are targeted towards youth from poor neighborhoods. These youth are disproportionately from a North African or African background. Such policies can be seen as a pragmatic loophole around the restrictions of the so-called republican ideal.

These measures usually aim at supporting individuals: helping young people, for whom it is difficult to enter the labour market, to find or keep a job. This is accomplished with the help of voluntary workers with ties to local employers. Either a local job center, a company network (Chambers of Commerce and Industry, for instance) or a non-profit organization bring the voluntary workers and the young people together. In the region Midi-Pyrénées for instance, 28 networks of this kind were set up in the eight departments, with 1,100 voluntary workers supporting almost 2,000 young people.

Another program, "Young graduates", was set up under the aegis of the local Roubaix Integration Plan, and aimed at helping young graduates who had spent at least two years in a university or a polytechnic, and who had been unemployed for at least six months, to find work. Of these, the clear majority (79.7%), were minority children of immigrant parents. There were several steps: first, regular and individualized interviews; second, logistical assistance (computers, help to write a résumé); and finally, targeted training. As a result, 50 people out of the 300 who participated the program secured a permanent contract, and 165 others were able to find fixed-term contracts. This is a "success rate" of 72%.

According to the participants, they never would have found a job without the psychological and moral support they received within the scope of the program. They claimed that this made them feel supported and helped them becoming more dynamic. It should be noted that the program was not made solely for those who may be confronted with discrimination, but was designed within the scope of common law. Figures conclusively show, however, that foreigners and children of immigrant parents (likely members of our target minority group) were especially helped. Again, without changing the constitution or major laws of France, and also working in harmony with existing structures and social norms, these policies had definite and targeted positive impact on the Muslim minority group.

Policies regarding Muslim women

French women have relatively high employment rates compared with their European counterparts (Kepel, 2011). However, French women also more often have part-time jobs, and their average salary remains lower than a man's. No specific policy in France is aimed at the employment of migrant or Muslim women, though they share the same benefits as every other woman residing in France, of generous social security benefits and protective labour legislation, such as a ban on lay-offs of pregnant women or extended childcare. On the other hand, in the past decade, religious Muslim women have been targeted by policies that jeopardize their ability to find a job or participate in French public life to the same extent as other members of French society.

In April 2011, France introduced a law, that was officially against covering one's face in public, clearly aimed at Muslim women wearing a full-face veil (*niqab*, or *burka*). Muslim women in *niqab* are now banned from any public activity including walking down the street, taking a bus, going to the shops or collecting their children from school. French politicians in favour of the ban said they were acting to protect the "gender equality" and "dignity" of women. There are no reliable statistics on how many women in France wear the *niqab*, nor in France and whether they have kept wearing it

since the law. It is estimated that only a few hundred women wear it, mostly French citizens. Muslim associations say a minority of women have taken off the *niqab* or moved abroad. The impact on Muslim minority women is obvious: if they choose to wear the *niqab* according to their cultural tradition, they are not only at higher risk of unemployment, they are not allowed to even walk down the streets in France.

Urban Policy

Urban Policy in France is the name given to a series of government initiatives in the aid of blighted neighborhoods, where immigrants and their families have long been concentrated. This policy has been in place for three decades, and during this time, different approaches have been taken, with mixed results. The budget allocated to Urban Policy has been consistently high, even as instruments of policy have changed over the years.

As has already been seen, they have been focused more on problematic areas than categories of people. Whereas in the 1990s, their aim was often to mitigate the economic crisis plaguing the immigrant-heavy neighborhoods, by trying to attract businesses to the area or by offering subsidized public jobs to minority youth; in the 2000s, focus has shifted to a more defeatist approach to the problem: renovating the neighborhoods, or even destroying them and relocating families to new housing has become the priority and huge sums of money have been allotted to this. While such policies are aimed at the criminal gangs that have often taken control of those neighborhoods, they do little to improve the social situation of families, and youth, who are forced to move. The impact on the Muslim minority, in particular Muslim minority youth, the group with the highest levels of unemployment, was positive prior to 2000's, when they had better chances at getting hired at public jobs due to the subsidies. Since the focus has shifted, however; the impact is mixed: on the one hand, better neighborhoods, on the other hand, some are forced to move, which does nothing to improve and perhaps detracts from their social

situation.

In the 2011 national budget, the Urban Policy received 618 million Euros for new public housing, 310 million Euros for economic help for inhabitants of blighted neighborhoods, and up to 12 Billion Euros for "Urban Renewal" programs, consisting of widespread demolition and reconstruction of those neighborhoods[18]. Compared to the funds allocated for these housing and neighborhood improvement projects, the money available for job training or to attract investment and businesses to the area; or support entrepreneurship amongst the residents of these areas, more radical and productive measures, is minimal to non-existent. This is a telling sign of the current status of the French attitudes about the rehabilitation possibilities for disadvantaged residents of ethnically diverse (predominantly Muslim minority groups) neighborhoods, and it is difficult to determine who the intended beneficiaries of such a program are: the minority residents of these impoverished neighborhoods, or the aesthetic tastes of the majority population.

18 http://www.ville.gouv.fr/?Le-Senat-adopte-un-budget-de, Ministry of Urban Policy website.

The Netherlands

In the sections to follow, the Netherlands is the focus; in particular, the Dutch unemployment environment, as well as the Dutch Muslim minority population situation. To begin with, the Dutch Muslim minorities' history is presented, offering some insights into the roots of their unique integration and employment problems. A brief section on general unemployment in the Netherlands, including statistics and trends follows. Non-ethnic factors impacting unemployment in France are then introduced and discussed in brief before the focus turns to the Muslim minorities' unemployment environment in modern day Holland. Dutch general public unemployment policies are listed and elabourated upon, before introducing and discussing policies that are more targeted specifically towards the Muslim minority groups. Following explanations of public policies and their effects, both intended and unintended, the impact of all of the particular policies on the minority groups is presented.

History of Muslim minorities in the Netherlands

The Netherlands is a country with a long tradition of immigration. Four different types of immigrants can be distinguished: immigrants from former Dutch colonies, those from Mediterranean and North African countries and, more recently, immigrants from Eastern Europe, and asylum seekers. It is now estimated that 1.7 million people in the Netherlands (out of a total population of 16.4 million, making up around 10% of the total population) originate from, or have parents from non-Western countries. Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans/Arubans make up nearly two-thirds of these non-Western ethnic minorities. Out of those, a little more than half (around 850,000 persons, or 5.8% of the total population) are Muslims or come from a Muslim background, most of them Turkish or Moroccan (FORUM, 2008).

These different types of immigrants have different levels of integration and

assimilation. Challenges related to the particular immigrant group vary greatly between the groups as a result. Some face problems related to the language, while others experience prejudice because of skin color, religion or ethnic background. Still others are inhibited by lower levels of education, and the lower levels of income that is often a result.

Due to the Netherlands' colonial background, (the Caribbean Antilles still belongs to the Netherlands), there are many immigrants from these former (especially from Surinam), or current colonies (especially from the Antilles). After the economic crisis in the Antilles in particular, the influx of immigrants to the Netherlands from this region makes up 3000–7000 immigrants per year (M&EV, 2009). As many of these immigrants are, or were, Dutch citizens, they speak Dutch (albeit with a regional accent), they have followed a standard Dutch education system, they are assimilated in the Dutch registration and administrative systems and share a similar religious background. On the other hand, there are several cultural traditions that differ between the colonies and the Netherlands and the average level of education and income are lower than in the Netherlands proper.

In the 1960s, there were high levels of emigration from the Mediterranean or North African countries. Many of these predominantly low-qualified "guest workers" remained in the Netherlands, but with limited success in terms of integration. Integration in this sense refers both to cultural considerations (the "Dutch way" of doing things) as well as socio-economic ones (unemployment remains significantly higher amongst this immigrant group compared to others). In addition, language poses a significant barrier for this group.

A third group of immigrants are workers from East-Europe predominantly working in the agricultural sector. Especially since 2004, with the advent of the accession of

several former Eastern Bloc countries, low wage labour flooded into the Dutch agricultural labour market. This is, at least at first glance, ideal for both the immigrants, as well as the host country, as native Dutch agricultural workers are too expensive and decreasingly in supply (especially as Dutch youth tend to have higher and higher levels of education). Most of the profit is made by the farm or greenhouse owners (Dutch natives), Dutch consumers are able to buy agricultural products at lower costs, and the immigrant workers earn wages higher than what is currently available in their native countries. Also, in this type of work, language skills are of lesser importance.

In spite of its small size, the Netherlands receives the third highest number of refugees and asylum seekers in the EU. Particularly juvenile asylum seekers hold a high percentage in the number of immigrants. With the Aliens Act of 2000, which was enacted in 2001, the Netherlands revised their laws on asylum and immigration in a more efficient--but also in a more strict--way. Human Rights Watch has criticized that with this new law, the Netherlands has not only increased deportation efforts and set tougher requirements for asylum seekers' successful admission, but has also lowered the chances of integration. Related to this criticism, the new asylum law has led to disadvantages in housing and property conditions among refugees and asylum seekers during and after their rejection, as well as during their application.

Since the first oil crisis in the 70's, and the following decline in economic growth, immigration policies have become consistently more restrictive since 1994. The proportion of the total population in the Netherlands taken by non-western inhabitants, however, has increased steadily because of low levels re-emigration and a high number of immigrants for family unification reasons (especially among migrants with Turkish or Moroccan origin.) These often lesser-qualified and poorly integrated immigrants became a problem due to a noticeable increase in the number of crime cases, especially in cities like Amsterdam and Rotterdam.

In 2002, the right wing politician Pim Fortuyn, who was shot shortly before the elections, used the increasing discontent amongst the Dutch population to help his political success with statements of disapproval about Islam and immigrants of this religion in the Netherlands. The successful election of his LFP Party in a coalition of a new center-right government led new strict policies towards asylum seekers and immigrants. Although the downfall of this coalition and the failure of the LFP, the successful Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) continued to pursue a strict migration policy.

As a result, the number of immigrants and asylum seekers in the Netherlands has decreased in recent years, largely because of the fall in economic growth and a more restricted government immigration policy. In 2003, the number of new immigrants without a citizenship of the Netherlands was a mere 75,000. That is a significant reduction of new immigrants, as compared to an average of 100,000 in the 1970s (Abell & al., 2005). The population of non-western foreigners is estimated at around 10 percent, while the overall population of non-western first or second-generation immigrants is estimated at around 17.5 %.[19]

Unemployment in the Netherlands

As of May 2012, the unemployment rate in the Netherlands is the second lowest in the EU at 5.1%. The legal system of the country has been praised for its ability to maintain a high level of employment by offering various part-time employment benefits and numerous incentives for job search. A lesser-cited reason for this low unemployment is the cultural norm of personal identity being strongly interrelated with a person's employment. One of the first questions asked in polite conversation after "What is your name?" is, invariably, "What do you do?" Unemployment services often include counseling for depression that is common amongst the long-time unemployed.

19 Statistics Netherlands (CBS): "The Netherlands in Figures"

The Netherlands has one of the most open economies in Europe, dependent on world trade and international economic cycles; and as such, it is vulnerable to global crises such as the one that began in 2008. Rotterdam is Europe's largest port, employing more than 87,000 people, producing over 11.6 million Euros in added value and processing over 430 million metric tons in and out of the harbor.[20] Still, during periods of prosperity, the Dutch labour market is usually a job seeker's market, and companies often struggle with shortages in available workforce. A consequence of which is, that even during crises, they are less inclined to let go of their workers despite the fall in sales and strain on corporate budget, in order to retain the talent for when the business climate eventually improves (Janssen, 2011).

Other factors also help to explain the low unemployment rate: as in France, the position of the employee, especially with respect to dismissal, is better protected than in many other countries, and Dutch unions often yield strong power in big companies, in a system comparable to Germany's. Rather than seeking out unemployment benefits, Dutch workers often resort to self-employment between jobs, as the market is much more developed for such opportunities than in similar European countries, especially in the service industry; this entrepreneurial spirit helps buffer the effects of any crisis.

Non-ethnic unemployment factors in the Netherlands

The economic crisis of the 1980s hit the Netherlands, more even than Germany, leading to a drastic restructuring of employment in the Netherlands. This applies in particular to the job losses in industry, a sector that has been traditionally saturated by immigrant workers. Surplus employees were transitioned *en masse* from employment to receiving social security benefits, which were, at that time, generous enough to keep them

20 http://www.portofrotterdam.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/employment.pdf
http://www.portofrotterdam.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/added_value.pdf
http://www.portofrotterdam.com/en/Port/port-statistics/Documents/overslag_eng_4e_kwart._2011.pdf

permanently outside the labour market. This illustrates the importance of social security as a contextual factor in the Netherlands.

In the Netherlands, transitioning to disability benefits can be an easy and financially attractive exit route from the labour market. Barring the strong cultural norm to work, and the strong attachment the Dutch have with their job as part of their identity; there is nothing standing in the way of large scale abuse of this social security system. As many members of the minority do not share this same Dutch work ethic, or had no other attractive options when work in the industrial sector decreased, there is a proportionally higher number of *allochtonen* (meaning literally, multi-colored, or having non-Dutch ethnic background) in the social welfare system than *autotonen* (meaning literally, own color, or having a Dutch ethnic background.) This leads many members of the Dutch majority, known for being money-conscious in general, to view this group critically and strengthen the prejudice against them in the labour market.

Unemployment amongst Muslim minorities in the Netherlands

Ethnic minorities in the Netherlands suffer from unemployment rates much higher than the average Dutch population, with unemployment at roughly twice as high as the general rate. In 2009, when the overall rate of unemployment was 5% in the Netherlands, non-western minorities suffered from a 11% unemployment rate. This breaks down to 10% for Turks, and 12% for Moroccans. As for the general population, youth are hit especially hard by unemployment, at over 20% for 15-25 years old. Even more problematically, there has been an upward trend in minority youth unemployment in the last decade, and the second generation experiences even more difficulties than their immigrant parents (FORUM, 2009).

Unemployment among youth from ethnic minorities reached a climax in 2005 when it reached the astronomical height of 27%. This was followed by a sharp decline to 15% two years later, in 2007. Since the 3rd

quarter of 2008, however, there have once again been signs of an upward trend. Youth from ethnic minorities were hit harder by the financial crisis than their more senior countrymen. In 2009, unemployment among youth in the age category 15-24 increased from 19 to 21%. Unemployment also rose among those in the age category 25-34, from 8 to 11%. It is striking that unemployment among persons over 55 actually declined. This could be the result of the fact that older minority members have a more secure labour position, such as a permanent employment contract and membership in a trade union.

General public policies on unemployment in the Netherlands

During the 1960s and 1970s, the Dutch welfare state developed considerably under principles of co-financing: the employers, the workers and the state, are together responsible for contributing to most social benefits, including unemployment insurance. Traditionally, the first six months of unemployment are financed from a fund paid into by employers; after that, the premiums are reduced and come from a general fund financed by employees (and employer contributions), with the state filling any potential deficit. The system was too generous, however, to withstand years of relatively high unemployment rates, and calls to modernize it were part of the program of the Dutch government starting from the early 2000s (De Mooji, 2004).

The Long-term Policy Plan presented to the Lower House in November 2000, targeted both people living off social benefits, whether or not they were looking for a job, and people who had never been employed despite possessing a set of competences. A wide-ranging package of measures has been developed for this purpose. In addition to the general labour market policy, the cabinet is pursuing a specific labour market policy for groups for which participation in the labour market can be increased.

Nonetheless, there are various problems in the Dutch labour market. Although there

are many unfilled vacancies, there are still large groups of (often long-term) unemployed people, especially among those with lower levels of education and people from ethnic minority groups. The level of unemployment is also high among senior citizens, women and people with occupational disabilities. Current government policies are geared towards investing in education and broader employability (e.g. improving unemployed people's job skills).

Additional reforms related to unemployment involve asylum seekers in the Netherlands. The Dutch policy on asylum seekers is intended to promote their independence. In this context, efforts are being made towards providing asylum seekers with education, socially activating them and, under limited conditions (in accordance with the stipulations of the Foreign Workers (Employment) Act), guiding them into the labour market.

The Netherlands also attaches great importance to promoting the economic independence of women and sets out to incorporate gender equality in all of its policies. This has been given concrete form in various action points in the Long-term Policy Plan of November 2000, and has met success, as the gender imbalance in unemployment rates had disappeared by 2011.

In the past, one of the largest sources of the Netherlands' minority groups has been asylum seekers and their children; in addition, of course to the immigrant groups and their children. While this policy does not necessarily help with the currently unemployed members of Holland's Muslim minority groups, it is a positive step towards decreasing the number of future additions to this pool.

The foundations of Dutch policy towards minorities

One of the main tenets of the Dutch culture since the 17th century, when the Netherlands was among the first free republics on the European continent, is tolerance.

Two centuries ago, that meant that anyone who professed an opinion of their own, and who, as a result, was persecuted in their home country, could come to the Netherlands, live there peacefully, and even publish their opinions, as long as they abided by the ordinary laws of the Republic and lived a quiet life. Most French Enlightenment philosophers published their most rebellious works not in Paris, where censorship was still strong, but in The Hague, or Amsterdam. This tradition lived on, and adapted itself to the new migrations of the 20th century.

It should be made clear, however, that the Dutch culture is based on the tolerance of, which is subtly, but significantly, different from embracing, a foreign culture. As more and more immigrants came from non-European backgrounds, professing a foreign, more conservative, religion, such as Islam, this aspect became prominent: each could live according to his own customs, but side-by-side, without much interaction; and should by no means interfere with the Dutch practice or non-practice of different religious beliefs.

Not only migrants were affected by, and concerned with, this attitude. Dutch society organized itself between the two primary religious factions, precisely along such lines. The process is known as *pillarisation*, according to which, each main group in the nation would organize itself as an autonomous society; first were Catholics and Protestants, with their own schools and hospitals; then, mostly after 1945, came the Socialists and trade unionists. Each had their political parties, and power had to be shared (Zanden 1998).

From the 1960s, many assumed that immigrants could integrate in a similar way: as they had their own culture, they would develop their own institutions. At the same time, however, this situation, as the immigrants themselves, was seen as temporary. Until the 1980s, the mainstream of Dutch political discourse stuck to the idea that migrants were not there to stay; that the Netherlands was not a land of immigration. To that end, the very provision of their own schools, and in other ways not really opening Dutch culture to them, could be seen as helping them and their future return to their home country.

(Veldhuis & van der Maas, 2011).

Multiculturalism was an evolved form of that initial approach, developed as a response to the now obvious fact that immigrants, and their families, were there to stay. It aimed at the emancipation of the new "Muslim pillar" of Dutch society, by allowing them to develop their culture in the tolerant atmosphere of the Netherlands. This approach, however, started to decline from the mid-1990s, victim of two opposite processes. First, it became obvious that economic equality would not be possible unless Muslims were given the necessary tools to succeed in the Dutch economy: they would have to become part of Dutch culture, in order to understand its many unwritten codes. The other process is the political shift to the right, reflecting the increasing tensions and hostility between Muslims and non-Muslims, which led to the murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh and to the restrictive immigration policies of Rita Verdonk.

It can also be argued that this shift towards more restrictive, less tolerant policies, is the direct result of the failure of the previous, multicultural approach, to ensure harmonious integration, or even co-existence of the minorities with the majority (Costoiu 2008). Assimilationism is gaining grounds in the Netherlands both because of the need for better economic integration of the minorities, and as a result of the cultural hostility growing between communities, and accepted as a fact by the government.

Targeted public policies and their impact in the Netherlands

While overall unemployment in the Netherlands is relatively low, rates among the Muslim minority remain comparable to those in France. The entire system of employment in the country is based on a triumvirate of three core principles: the Dutch Protestant work ethic; the shared costs of unemployment amongst employees, their employers and the State; and the principle of education and skills development as the answer to finding employment. These values are shared by the majority population, but differences in their norms and values and those of the Muslim minority, lead to some

difficulties.

The first principle, the traditional work ethic left as a legacy of the Netherlands' historical ties with Protestantism, is a value not shared by the Muslim minority. While this minority also has its own system and values in regards to work, there tends to be a cultural bias towards caring for each other; as compared to the Dutch norm of "care for yourself, then care for others. Do not make yourself a burden for others to carry."[21] Under the Dutch system of norms and values, the only situations in which one should allow/expect assistance from others are those in which, for whatever reason, one is unable to help yourself. Therefore, if one is unemployed, but able bodied, one is able to help oneself. In other cultures, however, there is a more paternal model of assistance and support to those who become employed, assisting with finding new work and providing financial support in the meantime (White & al., 2010).

The second principle, referring to the financial distribution of the costs of unemployment among all participants: both employers and employees, as well as the government, also takes on a different tone when applied to the Muslim minority groups. To begin with, those who came as immigrants or are children of immigrants, have not already paid into the system, which creates a imbalance as, in this case, one of the three: employees, has not contributed to the fund. Secondly, with historically higher rates of unemployment amongst this Muslim minority group, it would naturally infer that those affected do not have employers (e.g. unemployment), so the second player of the three is not putting money into the communal pot, either. This leaves the entire burden, in the case of the unemployed members of the Muslim minority, on the Government, which is reflected in high taxes, and skewed statistics of social security benefits to Muslim minority groups, a fact that has played strongly in the current negative trend towards this entire minority group in Dutch politics.

The third principle of education and skills development being an answer to almost

21 Interview with Trudy de Rijk, March 2012

all forms of unemployment affects the Muslim minority differently from the general population as well. While, in general, non-minority members who are (temporarily) unemployed, benefit from some additional training, or further education; the minority groups are often disadvantaged already during their basic education (primary school and high school), and additional training in terms of a particular skill or additional studies at institutes of higher education cannot compensate for or reverse this deficit. Also, this principle ignores that there are other factors that affect the employment possibilities of this minority group, besides mere skill set and education. Prejudice and preferences for hiring people known to the hiring manager, or working within one's own network, are more relevant reasons why members of this group struggle with finding work; and this is a problem not overcome by mere training or education alone.

Largely due to the negative press in regards to Muslim minorities, as well as current political pressure to reduce the amount of public funds going to support this group, and cope with their higher levels of unemployment, there have been several policies created to reduce unemployment amongst this minority group. Several of these have been targeted towards particular neighborhoods and/or cities (especially Amsterdam and Rotterdam) where the minority population is in higher concentration than other cities. Others are targeted towards specific members of the Muslim minority: e.g. women, mothers, at-risk youth, etc.

Education policy

Concentration of Muslim minorities in the main cities of the Netherlands, and often in specific neighborhoods, has led to a phenomenon of segregation in the school system. A specific, and striking, nomenclature has even entered the language: Dutch people talk about "white" and "black" schools, the latter having a majority of students from a non-Dutch background. Studies have had conflicting results regarding the effects of such *de facto* segregation. It seems that children of migrant populations are more discriminated against and feel less well in almost completely 'white' schools, due to the

fact that they are generally negated by the large majority of the 'white' school population. On the other hand, almost completely 'black' schools are not favorable for social integration (Maier 2002).

From the end of the 1990s, "black" schools have been targeted in a government program to promote Dutch language proficiency, with positive results. Schools have acquired more experience with migrant children and studies show that the 'learning' difficulties (initial disadvantage, language competence, etc) are more and more handled in a realistic way. These problems are not any longer neglected with a paternalistic tolerance, as in former years, nor simply rejected, There is less over- (or under-) estimation of the competencies of migrant children than in former years as well.

Still, in general, the students from "black" schools do not achieve the same levels as native Dutch students, and do not enjoy the same access to the labour market.[22] In the 2000s, many municipal governments have tried to force parents to register their children in local public schools to prevent "white flight", taking their children out of "black" schools to register them in other public schools, or private schools. In 2011, however, the national government distanced itself from such policies. It has chosen not to pursue desegregation, choosing instead to defending the current situation as allowing for specific treatment of minority students' needs (Gerrits & Meerhof, 2011).

22 Hiske Arts, Anita Nabha, "Education in the Netherlands: Segregation in a "Tolerant" Society", http://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledgebase/6-education-in-the-netherlands-segregation-in-a-tolerant-society

Policies in favor of self-employment

Self-employment is encouraged among ethnic minorities because it is considered a good way to escape discrimination. Applications from Muslim minority members, as well as job interviews conducted with this minority group, have been proven to not be free of discrimination. NRO, a famous Dutch TV channel, aired a report showing two identical CVs: one with a typically Dutch name, and the other with a Turkish or Moroccan name, resulted in a 10 to 1 preference for the Dutch candidate. In other words, the CV with the minority-sounding name was $1/10^{th}$ as likely to result in an interview (Chambon, 2011). Similar results occurred when a typical blonde, blue-eyed Dutch candidate arrived for the scheduled interview, versus a dark-skinned, dark-haired, dark-eyed ethnic Turkish or Moroccan candidate. The numbers in this case were slightly lower at six to one. When a member of the ethnic minority is self-employed, however, they are able to avoid this process.

According to the Ethnic Self-Employment Monitor, the number of ethnic business owners is rising even faster than the number of native Dutch self-employed. Most ethnic business owners are male and impulsively set up a one-man business, mostly in the big cities in the west of Holland. This is, in part, due to the fact that as the Netherlands has become richer, the Dutch have become increasingly more risk-averse. This is demonstrated by the disproportionately high levels of insurances they pay for and is explained by the fact that employment with an employer offers much more security than being self-employed does. Members of the minority, however, are discriminated against in terms of getting jobs with these Dutch employers, and therefore have nothing to lose.

Because these minorities often lack a sound business plan, however, and have not studied the market, most ethnic business owners offer the same products and services to the same clientele as their competitors. As a result, a large percentage of them eventually face bankruptcy (van

den Tillart, 2001). This is an area of huge potential for policymakers in terms of targeted steps to lower unemployment among the minority groups. With more support in terms of business plans, marketing and financing, many more of these budding entrepreneurs will stay in business, and therefore, stay employed, paying taxes into the social system instead of extracting social benefits from it.

The Dutch Integration Policy

After two decades of an official policy of multiculturalism, the right-wing governments of the 2000s introduced a large-scale reversal of their traditional approach to immigration. Among them, the new *Dutch Integration Policy* is prominent: it aims at integrating existing ethnic minorities into the mainframe of Dutch society; as opposed to encouraging, or tolerating their cultural differences. One of the first goals of this policy is to increase Dutch language proficiency among immigrants and minorities. Successful completion of the state-funded language course enables immigrants, and long-term unemployed minority members, to participate in short conversations in familiar settings and to understand radio and television news broadcasts. In addition, the immigrant must be able to read brief, unambiguous texts and to write short notes. The integration course also contains modules on Dutch society, norms and values.

A novel element in the integration courses is the inclusion of tracks aimed at teaching work-related skills and improving access to the labour market. The policy goal is that by 2011, 80% of all integration courses will contain these work-related tracks. The government's aim is that 60,000 integration courses are completed every year from 2008 onwards. Most participants are likely to be female: in some municipalities this percentage is as high as 80%. This has the added benefit of providing not only for the improved employment chances of the Muslim minority population in general, but also of the Muslim minority women, who, like Muslim minority youth, experience higher levels of

unemployment. While the program is relatively new, and therefore the data for extensive policy analysis still somewhat incomplete, the initial success of the program is in the continually increasing number of participants. As language has proven to be one of the employment obstacles specific to minority groups, especially in the Netherlands, improved language proficiency will improve employment chances.

Also, the Dutch-imposed value of female freedom and liberation is being transferred to the Muslim minority groups, where it has not traditionally been a prevalent norm. Whether or not this is a rational, balanced choice between respect for the minority's culture and wanting to build a functional society, or if there are long term positive or negative effects for integration; still, in terms of potential for decreasing unemployment amongst this group, especially for the Muslim minority women, this job training is a positive step, as are the large numbers of participants from this subgroup in the programs.

Finally, in the current highly-charged political environment of the Netherlands, this policy, while not being necessarily the most effective or most efficient, has the advantage of being acceptable to the increasingly anti-Muslim sentiment of the right-wing, while simultaneously offering tangible benefits to minority group. Even as there is grumbling by the tax-paying population of the Netherlands about amounts spent on social welfare benefits for unemployed members of this minority, money spent on this project is supported and, in fact, lauded by the voting public of the Netherlands. Regardless of how significantly a policy aimed at reducing Muslim minority unemployment affects this group in a positive way; if there is no political support for it, it will not get the funding and not be implemented.

Positive discrimination

Positive discrimination is allowed under the Equal Treatment Act of 1994, under certain conditions. The Act allows for a temporary deviation from the non-discrimination

principle, but only under strict requirements, and only for the purpose of giving preferential treatment to people on account of their race/origin, sex and to people with a disability or chronic illness, and only if its purpose is to reduce the group's structural social disadvantages. Both companies and public services can practice positive discrimination. Such practices are subject to strict rules: they cannot target religious groups, such as Muslims, but ethnic ones (such as Moroccans). Additionally, no one can be excluded from the recruiting process: a job offer excluding non-members of a minority group would be illegal. The same goes for quotas. Positive discrimination can only be one factor among others in the recruiting process, and should play a role mostly in the case of equal qualifications.[23]

In order to enhance equal opportunity, the Dutch governmental and semi-governmental services also maintain such a policy of positive discrimination in the employment of underrepresented social groups, as an effort to promote access to the political process and to increase the influence of these groups on policy-making. In this way, women, disabled people and *allochtonen* (non-Dutch ethnic citizens) are considered to have equal access to work and influential positions. In the case of job vacancies within the civil service, an explicit call can be made, targeting these social groups to apply, and, in the case of equal suitability, their appointment is preferred.

These efforts at positive discrimination have come in for considerable criticism. Studies have shown that such measures can also have adverse effects, in that members of ethnic minorities feel that their accomplishments are devalued and ascribed to general characteristics (gender, ethnicity), rather than personal achievements. Half of the target group of minorities, especially Turks, Moroccans and Antilleans, are put off once a vacancy explicitly calls for '*allochtonen*' to apply (Klaver & al., 2005). In addition, their *autotonen* (ethnic Dutch citizens) colleagues, may share similar preconceptions; feeling that the "only" reason an *allochtone* colleague got the position was due to their ethnicity.

23 Site of the Dutch Equal Treatment Commission (CGB, *Commissie, Gelijke Behandeling*), http://www.cgb.nl

In highly competitive government jobs, this is a growing problem.

A further limitation to these positive discrimination policies is that, so far, they are only centered on jobs in the governmental and semi-governmental sectors. While large corporations are encouraged to pursue diversity policies, and maintain a workforce with proportions of minorities similar to those of the broader population, there are no motivational tools (tax rebates, or other deductions); nor are there significant negative legal consequences. As explained in the positive discrimination rules above, they are *allowed* to positively discriminate under certain specific conditions, not *forced* to or *sanctioned* for **not** pursuing it. The only thing that large companies could be subject to by not pursuing a policy of diversity is that, should they be sued by a member of a minority for discrimination, they would be disadvantaged in terms of "burden of proof" that there were other, non-ethnic reasons that they were not selected for the job.

In the last years, the policy of positive discrimination towards these groups has changed to a wider policy of diversity. The policy is no longer solely targeted at ethnic minorities, but now includes the entire socio-labour market. As such, a policy of broader diversity is pursued by encouraging the participation of people of different ages, sexual orientation, and different levels of education, as well as economically disadvantaged or other underrepresented groups in the labour market. This has the distinct advantage of improving the chances of these policies being accepted by the Dutch population as a whole, while watering down the amount of positive impact such policies could have specifically on Muslim minority groups.

Policies aimed at women

In the last decade, the Dutch government has taken initiatives aimed at encouraging participation of minority women in the economic and social life of the country. In 2005, a publicity campaign aimed at enhancing the participation of ethnic minority women in local community activities was titled 'At home in the Netherlands.

Participate!', making clear that participation is central to integration. In the current Dutch political discourse, such actions are explicitly aimed as Muslim women, and framed in terms of *emancipation* from their former culture, largely viewed as oppressive by Dutch society.

This can seem paradoxical in a society where the participation of female members of the general population, especially those with children, in the workforce, is traditionally lower than in many other European countries, such as France. A striking feature of Dutch society, in terms of women in the workforce, is the record number of women working part-time jobs (Veldhoen & al., 2006). However, that is mostly representative of native Dutch women, among whom, in 2002, only 27% of those employed worked 35 hours or more; by contrast, employed Turkish and Moroccan women worked full-time respectively 44% and 40% (Bevelander & Groeneveld, 2007).

One reason for this, is that, traditionally, when women in the Netherlands have children, they continue to work, but switch from full- to part-time. This practice has the negative side effect that every woman of childbearing age interviewing for a new job, or applying for a promotion, will be (informally) discriminated against for fear that she will either take maternity leave or reduce her working hours to part-time, a financial risk for the employer and a potential risk for colleagues working together on projects or in the position to have to take over the pregnant woman's or young mother's workload. On the other hand, among Turkish and Moroccan women, a lower percentage work outside of the home, especially after marriage, but of those that do, a higher percentage work full-time.

While, in general, these pro-female policies in the labour force serve as a positive factor for women searching for employment; at the same time, a certain percentage of the Muslim minority women are not looking for work, and, therefore, not technically categorized as "unemployed". The possible negative side-effect of such policies, besides putting undue pressure on members of the Muslim minority to work, while it is not their

tradition or culture to do so, is that such policies re-categorize these women as job-seeking, which will only serve to increase the numbers of Muslim minority unemployment due to the fact that they are considered job-seekers, thus counted in employment statistics, but are not actually looking for work, therefore likely to remain "unemployed".

Comparison and contrast between France and the Netherlands

The section about Unemployment in the European Union concluded with a targeted examination of the specific factors affecting unemployment amongst Muslim minority members. In the following two sections, the unemployment situations, first in France and, then in the Netherlands. are presented and discussed in detail. Each country's public policies on unemployment are reviewed, with a specific section elaborating on those minority specific policies, and their impact on the minority groups analyzed. In the following section, these topics are compared and contrasted between France and the Netherlands, beginning with comparison and contrast of the minority-specific factors affecting unemployment in both countries; followed by the public policies, and impact of these policies, for the Muslim minority groups within France and the Netherlands. This analysis provides the insights from which conclusions can be drawn, that is presented in the aptly-named Conclusion section, which directly follows.

Comparison and Contrast of Minority-specific Factors Affecting Unemployment in France and the Netherlands

When comparing the overall levels of unemployment between the Netherlands and France, it can be seen that the Netherlands generally has lower levels of unemployment as compared to its larger neighbor, France. When looking specifically at the Muslim minorities in each country, however, the differences are less marked. Absolute unemployment statistics in the Netherlands are still lower, even among the Muslim minority groups; but proportionately, both countries show Muslim minority unemployment rates twice as high as that of the general population (French 11%, Muslim minority in France 22%; Dutch 5%, Muslim minority in the Netherlands 10%). Similarly, both nations struggle with rates of Muslim minority youth unemployment that are strikingly comparable, both over 20% (French 22% and Dutch 21%).

The percentage of the total population filled by the Muslim minority groups, however, differs significantly between France and the Netherlands. While in France, the Muslim minority group constitutes 7% of the total population, or around 4 million people; the same group makes up a mere 3% of the total population in the Netherlands, made up of a group of around 400,000 members.[24] Other differences can be seen by taking a closer look at the relative difference in Muslim minority youth statistics. In France, the rate of unemployment of this subgroup of the Muslim minority constitutes a little over 2 times that of the national average. In Holland, however, the difference between the level of unemployment of the Muslim minority youth and the general population is 4 times higher, making unemployment of this demographic in the Netherlands two times higher than that of the same demographic in France.

Differences in Impact of Education on Minority Unemployment in France and the Netherlands

Another major difference between minorities in France and the Netherlands is the role that education plays in inhibiting their chances in the labour market. In France, the education system divides students entering high school into three paths; two of which lead to significantly less preferable qualifications later when students enter the job market; and which, simultaneously, show higher numbers of Muslim minority youth than the third path which leads to the best jobs. What this means is that, even though employers and French administration are not able to discriminate based on ethnic background; they can and do discriminate based on differences in education, which in turn is to some extent determined by ethnic background.

In the Netherlands, on the other hand, while there are definite differences between so called "black schools" and standard Dutch schools ("black schools" are those schools where there is a high concentration of minority students), with the black schools having proven lower levels of quality and correspondingly low academic performance and test

24 http://islamicweb.com/begin/population.htm

scores; there is no specific obstacle to employment for students graduating from these schools. Attendance at the university is strictly dependent on the student's performance and test scores; and while these are in some part a result of the quality of education the student receives, they are more dependent on the student's own ability and motivation. Also, employment post-graduation is more a factor of whether or not the student has studied at the university or not, what area they have studied, what skills they have, and what grades they earned, than what their ethnic background is. This only comes into play later with the individual prejudice of the hiring manager at a particular company in terms of seeing the name on the CV or impressions during the interview.

Differences in Impact of Geography on Minority Unemployment in France and the Netherlands

The geographical characteristics of both countries differ, and therefore the impact these characteristics have on the minority group varies as well. As is discussed previously in this work, the transition of work from agricultural fields to technological ones has a direct and disproportionate impact on Muslim minority labourers. In France, the boundaries between urban and rural areas is clearer than in the Netherlands. France is many times larger than the Netherlands, and a move from the agricultural south, or from the industrial north, to the urban center of Paris, for example; is much more drastic than between agricultural areas in the south and east of the Netherlands and urban centers in the Randstad, or industrial Rotterdam, one of the largest cities in the Randstad. In the Netherlands, the cities and villages more or less merge, with little space in between and even less clear distinguishing characteristics. In France, this is not the case: Rural and Urban areas are decidedly different and their areas are clearly defined.

Differences in Impact of Prejudice on Minority Unemployment in France and the Netherlands

While prejudice against members of the Muslim minority groups is present in both France and the Netherlands, the nature, level of acknowledgement and expressions

of it differ significantly; thereby resulting in difference in the impact prejudice has on the minority group. In France, racism is considered by most to be shameful and, though prejudice exists, it is not generally acknowledged. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, while racism is also not considered generally acceptable, the existence of prejudice and discussions of it are widely prevalent. On the other hand, the French are in general more conscious of the prejudices they do have (though prefer not to talk about); while the Dutch tend to deny having any prejudices, while in fact having many deeply held ones.

Also, while the Dutch are proud of their tolerance and promote integration, they simultaneously doubt its ultimate success, as the common belief is that the cultures of the Dutch mainstream and the Muslim minority groups are too different. At best, the minority groups should be allowed to live as they wish, as long as this does not inhibit or interfere with the Dutch way of life (e.g. criminality, religious expression in the form of disruptive or loud calls to prayer, lack of language skills or expressing intolerance to gays, casual sex, feminine rights or freedom of speech and expression). The French, on the other hand, see their culture as much more multi-cultural by default and as able to absorb and encompass many other beliefs, values, practices and styles. As one French interviewee expressed it: "why can't they become French, we are just living normally and everyone could do exactly the same?"[25]

Differences in Impact of Language on Minority Unemployment in France and the Netherlands

A further consideration to keep in mind when comparing the two groups is their language, one of the characteristics identified above as being specific to the lower employment chances of this minority group. While both countries share similar historical reasons for the majority of their Muslim minorities, namely imported labour for the agricultural industry; France's Muslim minorities often came from former French

25 Interview with Gaspard D., June 2012

colonies in Africa, with the result that these immigrants and their children speak French. The same group of immigrants, however, came to the Netherlands speaking Arabic, Berber, French or Turkish and are therefore relatively more disadvantaged than their counterparts in France due to the language difficulties.

Similarities in Impact of Civil Status on Minority Unemployment in France and the Netherlands

Both France and the Netherlands were quicker to acknowledge the factual permanent resident status of what were first considered "guest workers" than, by contrast, Germany for example. France has always had a *jus solis* approach to citizenship: every person born on French territory would become French, making civil integration of immigrants' children straight-forward, and immigrants themselves have had access to naturalization processes. The process for naturalization of these minority groups in the Netherlands was also relatively easy and straight-forward; until, that is, the political backlash and stricter immigration policies of recent years.

Similarities in Impact of Culture on Minority Unemployment in France and the Netherlands

Also, the impact of cultural difference on employment possibilities for members of Muslim minority groups in both countries is similar, though in France it is more difficult to formally single them out due to the constitutional rule of equality. Except for the name, immigrant parentage or address in certain neighborhoods, Muslim minorities in France are harder to distinguish from the majority population. The Netherlands, as well, has anti-discrimination laws and regulations. In practice, though, prejudices continue to play a large role in the barriers to employment experienced by this minority group.

Comparison and Contrast of Public Policies on Unemployment and their Impact on Muslim Minorities in France and the Netherlands

In the individual sections focusing on France and the Netherlands, the public policies that each of the countries has implemented in order to try to fight unemployment are presented and discussed in detail. In this section, the focus shifts to comparing and contrasting the similarities and differences, both in their approach, and the individual country's policies; but also in their ultimate impact on the Muslim minority. As discussed elsewhere in this research, the sources and history of the Muslim immigrants in each country is different, and therefore the problems, or more accurately, the solutions to their individual unemployment problems, diverge as well. Additionally, the role of culture and national public opinion about the Muslim minority can also not be discounted or ignored. The ability and willingness of the local minority population to integrate, or take advantage of the policies, plays a role, Other factors, such as change in government or economic up- or downturns, and the current legal environment within each country will, to some extent, also determine the impact on the Muslim minority unemployment levels.

Similarities and differences in general approach to policy-making in France and the Netherlands

The general approach/view to integration in France and the Netherlands is different. In France, the idea is that the minorities can, and should, adapt to French society, which is viewed as broad enough to encompass all kinds of beliefs and cultures. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, the official view has moved from one of multiculturalism, with the idea that the individual groups should retain their culture and apartness, as long as it doesn't interfere with norms and values of the general Dutch society, to an assimilation model similar to France's, except that the current trend is to expect minority

groups now to conform with Dutch norms and values rather than merely not interfere with them. While France has always had, and maintains, a relatively stable idea of a single French society made up of many different cultures, while still remaining "French"; the Netherlands has gone from one extreme of tolerance, to a mono-cultural approach where successful integration into Dutch society requires minorities to shed their individual cultures and become more and more "Dutch". These different approaches to integration are reflected in their general approach to policy-making.

Another major difference between France and the Netherlands, related to their approach, is to what extent they do or do not distinguish their minority groups from the majority. The French constitution, and republican model, precludes the possibility of identifying the minority as a separate group from the majority, especially in policy making. French policies are generally targeted at reducing general unemployment, and therefore also the Muslim minority; or at economically disadvantaged groups, and thereby including the Muslim minority. This makes it difficult not only to deal directly with the existing, but not formally recognized, problem of higher unemployment amongst this minority; but also nearly impossible to measure the direct impact of any particular policy on this group. In the Netherlands, however, not only is this minority group targeted in policy making, they are identified and clearly distinguished as different from the majority group with words like *allochtonen* versus *autotonen.* It can be argued that this has a negative affect on integration. On the other hand, it is easier to see the direct effects, either positive or negative, of certain policies—even those policies not directly targeting them—on the Muslim minority population in the Netherlands.

Other ways in which French and Dutch policy-making diverge are the general approach to solving unemployment problems. In France, organizations such as the FASILD and Acsé, assist victims of discrimination with legal assistance, a practical, albeit after the fact, solution. In the Netherlands, though, like France, the basic tenants of the EU law for Human Rights which provides for freedom of discrimination are officially shared, the formal policy of affirmative action merely "allows" for positive

discrimination in very specific circumstances. On the other hand, where the French try to promote gender equality, especially among the Muslim minority, by outlawing *niqab*; the Dutch answer to Muslim female minority equality is a 2005 marketing campaign: "At home in the Netherlands. Participate!" Several of France's public policies aimed at reducing unemployment, had an urban renewal element; while the Netherlands' public policies in regards to unemployment, dealt strictly with unemployment, or other employment related factors such as language ability or education. Both nations, however, recognize and in some way address the language factor as a cause of unemployment.

A final general difference between French and Dutch policy making is the assumed relationship between the government, and policies, and the Muslim minority groups. Whereas in France, the government identifies problems *facing* the Muslim minority groups, and then makes policies which try to solve those problems *for them,* by setting up special ZEP schools, for example, and trying to reduce the problem of lower levels of academic performance by reducing the teacher-student ratio; in the Netherlands, policies are designed with the aim of solving the problems *caused* by the minority *for* the majority, as is best illustrated by the Dutch Integration Policy and offering job-related training in addition to integration courses that include a language element. Of course these training programs benefit the Dutch Muslim minority participants, but the main goal of the program is to increase levels of assimilation by this minority group and therefore reduce the problems of unemployment caused by them.

In the following sections, the similarities and differences between specific French and Dutch policies targeting certain aspects of unemployment are discussed in detail. These are the factors that emerge from the actual public policies as discussed in the individual country sections. The following themes emerge repeatedly in the public policies of both countries and will therefore be the structure used to further compare and contrast the French and Dutch public policies on unemployment (in no particular order): education, entrepreneurship, language, anti-discrimination/affirmative action, and gender.

Similarities and differences in unemployment policies focused on education in France and the Netherlands

In this study, the correlation between Muslim minority members and lower levels of education has been established. In addition, the relationship between lower levels of education, and higher levels of unemployment, have also been demonstrated. For this reason, one of the primary policy tools that France and the Netherlands have in dealing with the problem of Muslim minority unemployment is to try to improve their level of education, thereby improving their job opportunities. Both France and the Netherlands have made policies in relation to Muslim minorities and education; their approaches, however, have been diametrically opposite.

In France, a policy that provided for funding for special ZEP schools was developed. They had identified the problem that minority children had lower scores and lower levels of participation in higher education, and decided that the solution would be in the form of special schools, targeted especially at this minority, with a better student-to-teacher rate than was currently available at the other French public schools. The program was largely seen as a failure, due to the fact that, though the per-student costs were 10% higher than in other schools, there were only 2 fewer students per teacher than in those other public schools; and, ultimately, there was no effect on academic performance. A further negative side effect of this policy was the adverse effect had on integration as wealthy "white" children, were enrolled by their parents in private schools.

No formal policy designed to form schools specifically for children of minority groups was ever made in the Netherlands. However, minority concentrations in certain urban areas had the *de facto* result of similarly high minority percentage of the student population at schools in those areas. In addition, migrant children at predominantly "white" schools reported feeling uncomfortable as they were marginalized by the majority population at these schools. Recognizing the lower test scores and overall performance of students from these "black" schools, the Dutch government made a

policy to provide additional support to these schools and teachers of these schools and to target them for Dutch language proficiency. This policy had positive results as teachers gained experience working with these minority groups and were able to better handle what had previously been considered "learning difficulties" and lower the levels of under- (or over-) estimation of student abilities.

Similar to the situation in French ZEP schools, parents of "white" children registered in "black" schools began to deregister their children from those schools and transfer them to "white" schools elsewhere. In 2000, in order to try and stem this "white flight" some municipalities tried to force registration in the local "black" schools. In 2011, however, this was disallowed at the national level. No desegregation policy was pursued, citing that the special needs of the children were already being met by the current policies.

Additionally, at the local level, in Roubaix, France, the "young graduates" program was developed to target minorities who had studied for at least two years at a university or polytechnic institute, and had been employed for at least six months, to find work. This was done with a series of personalized job training and job-hunt coaching. This program enjoyed a 72% success rate among its participants, with 17% of the 300 participants receiving permanent contracts at the end of this project, and 55% finding fixed-term contracts.

By contrast, the Netherlands pursues a strict non-affirmative action policy when it comes to minority students. In a research paper done by Bastedo (Bastedo, 2008), the various members of the universities' staff, though some admitted that there was a problem of under-representation of this minority group at the university level, unanimously refused to entertain the idea citing that it was the obligation of universities to remain separate from and independent of political agendas, including (apparently), in this case, affirmative action.

Similarities and differences in unemployment policies focused on entrepreneurship in France and the Netherlands

One way to reduce unemployment is to stimulate entrepreneurship. As explained earlier in this work, labour supply and demand directly impact unemployment. By stimulating entrepreneurship through various public policies, the government simultaneously reduces supply of labour to the market (e.g. the entrepreneur is self-employed rather than looking for employment) and increases the demand of labour in the market (e.g. even in the case of one-man businesses, commercial activity increases the need for products and services, which increases the providers of said products and services' need for labour). In addition, this helps with other macroeconomic factors such as GDP, which have a positive impact on lowering levels of unemployment in general. While neither France, nor the Netherlands, has a public policy on entrepreneurship specifically targeted at the Muslim minority, the benefits of such programs are available to members of this community.

On the 04th of August, 2008, in France, a new form of entrepreneurship, the "auto-entrepreneur", was introduced with the Law on Economic Modernization. This policy served to simplify procedures for auto-entrepreneurs, and had 500,000 participants in the first two years. The program was largely considered a success due primarily to the fact that participants of this program generated 4,364 Billion Euros in revenue. Criticisms of the success of the program are the fact that 50% of the participants reported no revenue, and 40% of them participated in the program as a supplement to their main income.

The Netherlands, on the other hand, has made no recent specific policy to promote entrepreneurship, having already established the *eenmanzak* (literally, the one-man business; the Dutch equivalent of the French auto-entrepreneurship) long before. The procedures of starting an *eenmanzak*, or any other legal business form, in the Netherlands, is relatively quick and easy; the process is transparent and employees at the *Kamer van Koophandel* (Chamber of Commerce) are available without appointment,

daily, to assist applicants. It has been observed, however, that there are higher levels of entrepreneurial activity amongst Holland's minority groups than self-employed members of the Dutch majority. A large number of these, often spontaneous, entrepreneurial ventures fail due to insufficient market research or flawed business plans. There has been to date no policies on behalf of the Dutch government made to address this minority-specific problem.

Similarities and differences in unemployment policies focused on improving language or job-seeking skills in France and the Netherlands

Both the French and the Dutch governments have recognized the relationship between language ability and employment prospects. Elsewhere in this research, this relationship has also been explained. Therefore, it makes sense that in efforts to both increase integration, as well as lower levels of unemployment amongst minority members, these governments have made policies aimed at improving language proficiency among the minority groups. Often these language programs accompany larger job-seeking support programs (as is the case in France), or are accompanied by special job-skill training tracts (as is the case in the Netherlands).

In 2008, in the French reform of unemployment support, the government promoted a program where each job seeker would be assigned one employment advisor to help them with their job hunt. The promise was that each advisor would have a maximum of 100 job seekers assigned to them, but in the disadvantaged neighborhoods, primarily populated by members of the minority, the actual numbers were closer to 600 to 1, with a drastic impact on the amount and quality of assistance offered. In this case, while the program may have been helpful to reduce rates of employment among the general population, French minority members had little gain.

Acsé, the French institute, was formed to help provide minorities with training programs, and provide French language training, in addition to offering legal help and funding community-based NGOs. While the constitution does not allow for blatant identification of minority members, this policy finds a loophole in providing French language training to ALL residents in France, while only the non-French speaking minority members have need of such training. Statistics on the specific number of people who have completed these language training programs, as well as any change in their employment status, are not available; but it is safe to assume that their employment chances were not *worsened* as a result, meaning that the minority participants in these French language programs were at least as well of, if not better, in terms of their employment prospects as a result of completing the programs.

As mentioned in the section comparing unemployment policies focused on education, one of the primary targets of both the ZEP programs in France, and the "black" school government support in the Netherlands, improving language skills played a large part. This not only improved their employment chances by improving their level of education, but also directly improved chances of employment by lessening or removing the language barrier.

The Roubaix Integration plan, also mentioned in the education section, not only offered training to young graduates, but also provided youth job centers for unemployed youth, a large majority of which, were minorities. While not explicit as to whether or not language training was offered, specialized job-seeking training was provided to members of this minority group.

In the Netherlands, the Dutch Integration Policy explicitly aims to improve Dutch language proficiency among members of the minority via state-funded language courses. Additionally, courses teaching work-related skills have been added to these Integration courses, with the goal of having 80% of all integration courses include the work-related skill track by 2011.

Similarities and differences in unemployment policies focused on discrimination or affirmative action in France and the Netherlands

One very direct way that public policies can reduce unemployment among minority groups is to make policies that combat discrimination or promote affirmative action. Both France and the Netherlands have implemented such policies, but to very different extents. While the French have only limited policies on affirmative action, other French policies provide for legal assistance to discrimination victims. The Netherlands', on the other hand, has an official policy on positive discrimination, while only allowing for it to occur, rather than actively promoting it. In most areas, Dutch prefer to avoid any preferential treatment for the majority, as well as the minority; and tend to view discrimination as both ways: discrimination by the majority against the minority, but also, in terms of positive discrimination, it is seen as discrimination by the minority against the majority.

While not having any national positive discrimination laws, France has adopted an anti-discrimination law on 16 November, 2001. This law is basically the transcription of the EU law on Human Rights, guaranteeing the Freedom from Discrimination from all minority members. In addition, the French organization FASILD, though initially being founded in 1958 for immigrant workers, to provide housing and social assistance; has been transformed in 2001 to provide legal assistance for discrimination victims. Similarly, the organization, Acsé, offers legal aid to minorities. France also has had a few affirmative action policies aimed at specific groups.

One such policy, attempted in 1990, by Jean-Pierre Chevènement implemented affirmative action in the Army, allowing more opportunities for advancement, skills workshops, and driver license training for young French North-Africans. As he resigned a

year later, however, this program was scrapped without leaving enough time to evaluate the impact. Some timid attempts have also been made in higher education, to allow more minority children into elite schools, but these most of these policies are based on neighborhoods rather than ethnicity. Two exceptions are at the Paris Political Sciences Institute, in 2001; and ESSEC business school in 2002. Both these initiatives have been considered successful and have had a positive impact on the minority group.

As mentioned above, the Netherlands tends to avoid affirmative action, viewing it as being discriminatory. In 1994, the Equal Treatment Act, a policy on positive discrimination was drafted, allowing for preferential treatment under a certain conditions. This act allows for a *temporary* deviation for the Dutch non-discrimination principle, but only under strict restrictions. In addition, the only purpose for giving such preferential treatment is if it is in order to reduce the minority group's structural social disadvantages. This act applies to both companies and public services, but cannot target religious groups. Ethnic minorities are allowed; quotas are not. It also cannot exclude non-minority members, but should mostly play a role in the case of otherwise equal qualifications.

The Dutch governmental and semi-governmental agencies have maintained such a policy of positive discrimination in order to try and enhance equal opportunity and increase minority representation in this field, as well as to promote access to political process and increase the influence of these groups on policy making. These efforts have received considerable criticism however as ethnic minorities feel their actual abilities are undervalued and their non-minority colleagues have the perception that the preferential treatment gives jobs to people who are under-qualified.

Similarities and differences in unemployment policies with regards to gender aspects in France and the Netherlands

Both countries have targeted Muslim women through proactive policies in the last

decade, and in both cases those policies were framed in terms of emancipation of the women from their "backwards" culture, a traditional assimilationist claim now popular again as fears of Islam are prominent in the public debate of both countries. France took the most prohibitive approach, at least symbolically, with the 2011 ban of the *niqab* in every public place. Many in the Netherlands called for such a law, especially in Geert Wilders' far-right party, but to no avail. The *niqab* ban does not affect many women (a few hundred), but puts them at risk of arrest if they go out, much more so if they attempt to work while keeping their attire. However, many women who wear the more discreet *hidjab*, already prohibited for public school students and teachers, and all public servants, feel indirectly targeted and kept away from the public sphere.

The Dutch policies regarding Muslim women have been less aggressive, and more focused on increasing their participation in social life, including by seeking jobs. Though it was framed in terms of emancipation from their families, the effect on unemployment can be the reverse of the intention, as it aims at turning people into job-seekers. Furthermore, the wisdom of this policy has been questioned, as the rate of activity among Muslim women was not significantly lower than among Dutch women.

This case shows that policies inspired by the same collective frame of mind – hostility towards conservative Islam, desire to "emancipate" Muslim women – can have opposite consequences for the employment of the targeted group. Even when they help some people to get jobs, it is at the price of demonizing a community further; and, in reaction, maybe to cause the domestic condition of those women to actually worsen.

Conclusion

Thus far in this research, variables have been selected and identified and hypotheses have been formulated in an effort to answer the following research questions:

- *Which general approach to integration seems to have a higher success rate, at least in terms of unemployment indicators*? *And, if possible, why? What theories serve to explain the success of this particular approach?*

- *Which specific policies have had the most positive effect on lowering the numbers of unemployment among the Muslim minority population in either France or the Netherlands? And, what are some theories or explanations for why these were successful?*

- *Which specific policies, or policy approaches, have had the least desirable impact on unemployment in this minority? What are the lessons to be learned? What should France and the Netherlands endeavor to avoid when making policies to address this group? What are the theories or explanations for the negative results incurred?*

- *Based on the above, what approaches and or policies would be recommended for future policy makers in France and the Netherlands in order to best try to reduce the problem of Muslim minority unemployment in their countries? What is the theoretical, or experiential basis of these recommendations?*

Background is given about unemployment in the EU, and the following topics for both France, as well of the Netherlands, are covered: history of Muslim immigrants in both of the countries, overview of the unemployment situation in both, including general and

minority specific factors, and public policies—both general and targeted—that have an impact on Muslim unemployment rates. This is followed with a section comparing and contrasting the policies of the two countries, using the comparison model of analysis as explained in the Methodology section. The results of this analysis make it possible to answer the research questions above.

The first research question deals with the main topic of integration and asks which approach is more successful in dealing with Muslim minority unemployment:

Which general approach to integration seems to have a higher success rate, at least in terms of unemployment indicators? And, if possible, why? What theories serve to explain the success of this particular approach*?*

The variables involved in this question are: **general approach to integration (**independent: multicultural, assimilative**); unemployment factors specific to the Muslim minority** (independent: prejudice, language abilities, civil status and cultural considerations); **level of unemployment among Muslim minority** (dependent); and **amount and civil status of immigrants vs citizens among Muslim minority** (dependent, optional).

The hypotheses related to this research question are hypotheses 1: **Muslim minorities suffer disproportionately from unemployment as a result of failure of integration approach;** and 2: **Assimilation approach is more successful than multi-cultural approach in promoting integration, thereby lowering unemployment amongst Muslim minority members.**

France's approach to integration has traditionally been assimilative. As it has not changed this approach over the period of this study, it would be more relevant to look at the Netherlands, which transitioned from multi-cultural to assimilative in recent years.

Prior to the full transition to assimilative approach, in 1998, when the Netherlands was pursuing a policy of full multiculturalism, the Dutch unemployment rates for the general population were 4% and for the Muslim minority 24% (van Ours, 1999). In 2009, after the full transition to the assimilative approach, including 2008 mandatory Dutch language lessons for immigrants, the Dutch unemployment rates for the general population were 5% and the Dutch Muslim minority were 11%. (Forum 2009) This leads to the conclusion that there is, at very least, a correlation between the transition from one approach to the other and the decrease in Muslim minority unemployment rates. Also, the failure of the multi-cultural approach as first pursued by the Dutch seems to be at least part of the reason for the switch to the assimilative one.

Conclusion: The assimilative approach to integration is more successful than the multi-cultural approach, at least in terms of unemployment indicators.

This could be due to the fact that assimilation, while perhaps increasing levels of resentment in the minority group, decreases prejudice in the majority against the minority as the members of the minority group become more like, more assimilated, to the majority. In addition, obligatory language courses improve the language skills of the minority group, leading to fewer barriers to employment. Assimilation approach has an impact on civil status in that it brings both minority and majority members onto a level playing field. They are both citizens of equal rights and responsibility, with the burden of integration placed on the shoulders of the minorities (cultural considerations).

The theory that can best explain this is the one proposed by Costoiu in regards to multicultural vs assimilation approach. (Costoiu, 2008)

The next research question deals with specific policies, either French or Dutch, which had the most positive effect on Muslim minority unemployment:

Which specific policies have had the most positive effect on lowering the numbers of unemployment among the Muslim minority population in either France or the Netherlands? And, what are some theories or explanations for why these were successful?

The variables involved in this question are: **general unemployment** factors (supply and demand) **unemployment factors specific to the Muslim minority** (independent: level of education, language abilities); **public policies on unemployment, general (**independent**); public policies on unemployment, specific to the Muslim minority** (independent); **level of unemployment among Muslim minority** (dependent); and **amount of Muslim minority women who are employed versus unemployed** (dependent, optional).

The hypotheses used in relation to this research question are hypotheses 2: **Assimilation approach is more successful than multi-cultural approach in promoting integration, thereby lowering unemployment amongst Muslim minority members;** 3: **Policies aimed specifically at minorities (as in NL) are more successful than policies resulting from official equality before the law (as in Fr);** 4: **Policies aimed at education and skills development have greater impact on Muslim minority unemployment than policies promoting affirmative action in the workplace (in both countries);** and 5: **Policies aimed at promoting entrepreneurship or self-employment are more effective at reducing unemployment for members of the Muslim minority than policies designed to help with skills training or job-seeking (in both countries).**

As France continues to refuse to officially recognize minorities as a separate subset of the French population, it remains difficult to make any public policies targeted at reducing unemployment amongst this subset, as well as to evaluate the relative success or failure of such policies at reducing the Muslim minority unemployment rates. Therefore, in the current situation, policies aimed at the general population for unemployment that

have a significant impact on the minority, are the most pragmatic solution. One such policy was the Law on Economic Modernization that created **auto-entrepreneurs**. Though there was criticism about this program, the results cannot be denied: 250,000 participants (half of the total) created revenue of 4,634 Billion Euros after two years of this program being implemented. If it is possible to target this policy or a similar one to the French Muslim minority, this would have a significant positive impact on reducing levels of unemployment by both reducing supply of labour to the market and increasing demand for the same.

The Netherlands also showed potential in the area of Muslim **minority entrepreneurship**. A larger number of minorities start companies as compared to the Dutch majority. Unfortunately, barring any support in market research or effective business planning, many of these have failed and will continue to do so. Nevertheless, this demonstrates an area of definite potential for Dutch public policy makers to make policies will fill these gaps, and help these minority entrepreneurs be successful. In so doing, the Dutch policy makers will reduce labour supply and increase labour demand according to the same principles as mentioned above in regards to France.

Another policy area that showed significant success in both France and the Netherlands was in the area **of language and additional job skills training**. For France, this came in the form of Acsé, with language training programs; but also in the form of the extremely successful Roubaix Integration Plan programs for young graduates, that had a success rate of 72% job placement amongst its minority participants. Similarly, though the available statistics were more focused on participation, the Dutch Integration policy offers Dutch language proficiency training as part of its general integration courses, and with a target of providing accompanying work-related skills training to 80% of these integration courses by 2011. An area where this policy has shown the most significant impact on the Muslim minority is in the area of Muslim minority women, who make up 80% of the participants in the courses.

A final public policy focus area, which has had mixed results, is that of **positive discrimination/affirmative action**. While both countries have transcribed the EU law for Human Rights in regards to discrimination, further efforts towards affirmative action differ. In France, the few attempts that have been made in this area, besides the legal help offered by both the FASILD and Acsé organizations, have either been: short-lived (as in the affirmative action policy for the French Army), limited to a few institutions (as in the case of Science Po' and ESSEC business school), or abandoned completely due to political pressures (as happened with Sarkozy's pro-affirmative action platform shortly after elections). However, those that could be measured: the two universities and Sarkozy's initial education reforms, proved successful in having a positive impact on the minority groups. If a more sustained, concerted effort towards implementing this policy in a wider-range of areas could be made, it is likely to have a positive effect on lowering levels of Muslim minority unemployment.

In the Netherlands, as well, the positive discrimination laws are loose and more permission to discriminate in certain cases. While it has enjoyed some success in terms of increasing representation of minority groups in Dutch governmental and non-governmental agencies, it has also incurred criticism from both the minority groups and their majority colleagues as well. In general, Dutch culture abhors discrimination, whether positive or negative, from the majority or towards the majority. For this reason, the semantics have been changed and rather than positive discrimination, policies aimed at achieving **diversity** are now in vogue.

Conclusion: The specific policies that have had the most positive effect on lowering the numbers of unemployment among the Muslim minority population in either France or the Netherlands are those that: promote entrepreneurship, improve language and job-hunting skills, and diversity.

Some reasons for this are similar to the theories about integration approaches above. Assimilation approach tends to be a more successful approach to integration

than multi-cultural approach. This approach requires the minority groups to assimilate into the majority: to learn their language and to participate politically, socially and economically. Entrepreneurship is a policy direction that is independent of the Muslim minority group and effects the entire population *including* the Muslim minority. Policies for programs to promote language skills obviously contribute to better integration, and special job-hunting skills training can assist the Muslim minority groups in overcoming their disadvantages as compared to the majority group, or in other words, to enable them to better assimilate into the job-seeking majority with similar and comparable job-hunting skills.

Finally, policies aimed at affirmative action, positive discrimination and diversity find their success for the same reasons as the job-seeking training; as well as their failure (or criticisms) in the areas where the majority is expected to *accommodate* the minority.

After looking at what policies have been successful, it is also useful to examine those policies that have not been successful and to try and understand the reasons for the failure. The following research questions addresses this:

Which specific policies, or policy approaches, have had the least desirable impact on unemployment in this minority? What are the lessons to be learned? What should France and the Netherlands endeavor to avoid when making policies to address this group? What are the theories or explanations for the negative results incurred?

The variables involved in this question are: **general unemployment** factors (supply and demand) **unemployment factors specific to the Muslim minority** (independent: level of education, geographical location); **public policies on unemployment, general (**independent**); public policies on unemployment, specific to the Muslim minority**

(independent); **level of unemployment among Muslim minority** (dependent); and **amount of Muslim minority women who are employed versus unemployed** (dependent, optional),

The hypotheses that relates to this research question are hypotheses 3: **Policies aimed specifically at minorities (as in NL) are more successful than policies resulting from official equality before the law (as in Fr);** and 4: **Policies aimed at education and skills development have greater impact on Muslim minority unemployment than policies promoting affirmative action in the workplace (in both countries).**

Of the various policies attempted by the French to reduce their unemployment problems among the general population (and thereby among the Muslim minority members of the general population, there were three policy focuses that proved failures. These were the **2008 reform of unemployment support**, the **Urban Policy**, and the **policies regarding Muslim women**. The first policy, the 2008 reform, was designed to help reduce unemployment by matching one job seeker to one advisor. The promise was that each advisor would have a maximum of 100 job seekers; while in reality, those advisors located in the disadvantaged areas (e.g. minority neighborhoods) had 600 job seekers, with the result that those who needed help the most, got it the least.

The second policy, relating to the Urban Policy, started out in the 1970's trying to attract business to disadvantaged neighborhoods and offer subsidized public jobs to minority youth who were residents there. By 2000, however, it abandoned all hope of helping residents of these neighborhoods and turned its focus instead to demolishing and rebuilding the neighborhoods (as demonstrated by a budget distribution of: 618 Million Euros to public housing, 310 Million Euros to economic help for residents of these disadvantaged neighborhoods, while allotting a whopping 12 Billion Euros to destroying and reconstructing these disadvantaged neighborhoods.)

The third policy, in regards to Muslim women, refers to the policy against wearing

anything that covers ones face in public. While this is a law aimed at everyone, it obviously targets Muslim women who wear the burka or *niqab*. Rather than promote these women's liberty as was the claimed goal of this policy, it drove *niqab* wearers to have to make the difficult choice to either: a) stay at home, b) flee the country or c) compromise their cultural beliefs and values. There are no statistics about how many women have been affected, and it is projected that there are only a minimal number, 200, of *niqab* wearers in the whole country. The policy, while having a tangibly negative effect on those it affected (as they obviously are also not able to work if they are not even allowed to go onto the street), but it is also a policy designed for such a small subset of a subset of a minority (*niqab* wearers, subset of Muslim minority women, subset of Muslim minorities) that it is insignificant in terms of real impact on Muslim minority unemployment.

In the Netherlands, the policy that has proved least successful is the **education policy** designed by some localities to prevent "white flight", as parents of non-migrant children hurried to un-enroll their children from "black schools" and enroll them in "white ones". This policy was unsuccessful in the first place by being overturned at the national level by the Dutch government who voted against any policies of desegregation, stating that minority students' needs were already being met. The policy also failed in that it had (or would have had) no real positive impact on the Muslim minority population as the minority students showed no significant negative impact of being at a primarily "black school". On the contrary, many stated that they felt uncomfortable being marginalized by the Dutch majority in the "white schools". In addition, concentrations of minorities in these so-called "black" schools, resulted in **language skill** support provided by the government, and special minority experience on the side of the teachers, enabling them to provide better quality education to these minority students.

Conclusion: The specific policies, or policy approaches, that have had the least desirable impact on unemployment in this minority are, for France: the 2008 reform of unemployment support, **the Urban Policy**, **and the policies regarding Muslim**

women; for the Netherlands: the education policy, specifically trying to prevent "white flight",

The lessons to be learned are that a) policies that fail to deliver what they promise, or more significantly, offer disproportionately negative benefits to the minority, such as the 2008 reform of unemployment support in France will, quite obviously, have a negative impact on Muslim minority unemployment levels; b) policies that are aimed at a peripheral problems, such as neighborhood beautification, as in the French Urban policy, will either have a negative or neutral impact and do nothing to improve the Muslim minority unemployment situation and c) further marginalize the minority group, such as the anti-*niqab* policy or the anti-"white flight" policy, only serve to exacerbate the problem. Therefore, France and the Netherlands should endeavor to avoid: a) policies that offer disproportionately negative benefits to the minority, b) policies aimed at peripheral, rather than core problems related to minority unemployment, and c) policies which further marginalize the minority group when making policies to address this group.

The theories or explanations for the negative results incurred by these policies are similar to the theories and reasons for the previous research questions. The assimilation approach to integration focuses on *lessening* the differences between the majority and minority groups, while a) policies that offer disproportionately negative benefits to the minority

The final research question is based on the previous three and brings the entire study together into a "what next"? The reason for examining the current policies of both countries, and using the comparison method of analysis, is to ultimately come up with conclusions as to what approaches or policies to recommend to future policy makers, with the idea of improving the problem of Muslim minority employment in both France and the Netherlands. Additionally, policy makers from other countries could benefit from

the lessons learned by the policy makers in these two countries:

Based on the above, what approaches and or policies would be recommended for future policy makers in France and the Netherlands in order to best try to reduce the problem of Muslim minority unemployment in their countries? What is the theoretical, or experiential basis of these recommendations?

The variables for this question are simply: **public policies on unemployment, general (**independent**); public policies on unemployment, specific to the Muslim minority** (independent); and **level of unemployment among Muslim minority** (dependent).

The hypotheses relating to this question are hypotheses 4: **Policies aimed at education and skills development have greater impact on Muslim minority unemployment than policies promoting affirmative action in the workplace (in both countries);** and 5: **Policies aimed at promoting entrepreneurship or self-employment are more effective at reducing unemployment for members of the Muslim minority than policies designed to help with skills training or job-seeking (in both countries).**

As demonstrated repeatedly in the conclusions reached by each research question, at least in terms of rates of unemployment, the **assimilation approach to integration** enjoys the most success. The policies that would be recommended, based on this study, would be unemployment policies with focus on: **entrepreneurship, improving language and job-hunting skills** and policies that pursue **diversity**. Of these three, entrepreneurship really shows the most potential for both France, as well as the Netherlands, in terms of significant, direct impact on lowering levels of unemployment amongst the Muslim minority.

The policies chosen should be examined for the following undesirable elements, in order to **avoid** them: **disproportional disadvantages for minority, only peripheral**

effect on minority unemployment, further marginalization of minority, and policies which are **ineffective,** or **unnecessary.** Also, for France in particular, reexamining its policy of non-identification of the Muslim minority could prove useful in being able to target policies at this group, measure their success and, finally, reduce the higher rates of unemployment amongst this group than in the general population.

The theoretical basis for these recommendations continues to be the greater success of the assimilation approach to integration over the multicultural one. In addition, the experiential reasons for the preference for or avoidance of specific policies can be found in the public policy sections of the body of this research.

Bibliography

Sources for statistics and legal texts

Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/

Eurofound, http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/

INSEE, Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, http://www.insee.fr

Legifrance, http://www.legifrance.fr

CGB, Commissie Gelijke Behandeling, http://www.cgb.nl

CBS - Statistics Nederlands, http://www.cbs.nl/

Works cited

Abell J.P., Havelaar A.E., Dankoor M.M. (2005), "The documentation and evaluation of anti-discrimination training activities in the Netherlands", EGA Research, Amsterdam.

Armagnague, Maïténa (2008), « Processus d'intégration des jeunes d'origine turque en France et en Allemagne », *Trajectoires*, 2 , http://trajectoires.revues.org/207

Arts H., Nabha A., "Education in the Netherlands: Segregation in a "Tolerant" Society", http://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledgebase/6-education-in-the-netherlands-segregation-in-a-tolerant-society

Azarian Reza (2011), "Potentials and Limitations of Comparative Method in Social Science", *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science,* Vol. 1 No. 4; April 2011.

Bastedo, Michael N. (2008), “Rethinking governance from the bottom up: the case of Muslim students in Dutch universities”, *Prospects*.

Bénabou R., Kramarz F., Prost C. (2004), “Zones d’éducation prioritaire : quels moyens pour quels résultats?”, Report for INSEE, Paris.
http://www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/docs_ffc/es380a.pdf

Bénabou R., Kramarz F. and Prost C. (2005), “The French Zones D'Education Prioritaire: Much Ado About Nothing?” CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5085, p.355. Available at
http://http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=776724

Bertossi, Christophe (2001), *Les Frontières de la Citoyenneté en Europe, Nationalité, résidence, appartenance*, Paris, L'Harmattan.

Bevelander Pieter, Groeneveld Sandra (2007), “How Many Hours Do You Have to Work to Be Integrated? Full Time and Part Time Employment of Native and Ethnic Minority Women in the Netherlands”, Discussion Paper, IZA.

Brouard, Sylvain, et Tiberj, Vincent (2012), *Français comme les Autres? Enquête sur les citoyens d'origine maghrébine, africaine et turque*, Presses de Sciences po, Paris.

Castles, Stephen et al. (2001), *Integration: Mapping the Field*, p. 14.

Chambon, L. (2011), *Le racisme et la discrimination aux Pays-Bas*, European Network against Racism report.

Chevron, Sylvain (2009). *La réforme des structures en charge de l'immigration: De l'ANAEM à l'OFII,* Paris, L'Harmattan.

Costoiu, Andrada (2008), “Modes of Minorities' Integration: Explaining Historical, Economic and Political Factors”, *Journal of Identity and Migration Studies,*
Volume 2, number 2, 2008

Coulmont, Baptiste (2012), *Sociologie des Prénoms*, Paris, La Découverte.

De Mooij R.A. (2004), “Towards efficient unemployment insurance in the Netherlands”, CPB Memorandum.

ECRI (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance), 2008, *Third Report on the Netherlands*, Strasbourg, Council of Europe.

EUMC (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia), *Migrants, Minorities and Employment in France*, 2003; http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/FR.pdf

Etzioni Amitai, Du Bow L. Fededrie (eds.) (1970), *Comparative Perspectives: Theories and Methods*, Boston, Little Brown, pp. 205-210.

Ferhat, Ismaïl (2010), "Quel Bilan pour les ZEP ?", *La Vie des Idées*, http://www.laviedesidees.fr/Quel-bilan-pour-les-ZEP.html

FORUM, Instituut voor Multiculturele Ontwikkeling (2008), *The Position of Muslims in the Netherlands; facts and figures*. www.forum.nl/pdf/factbook-islam-en.pdf

FORUM, Instituut voor Multiculturele Ontwikkeling (2009), *Ethnic minorities on the Dutch labour market: effects of the economic crisis.* http://www.forum.nl/Portals/International/English-pdf/FORUM-monitor-labourmarket,%202nd2009.pdf

"France's crisis of national identity", *The Independent*, 25 November 2009.

Gerrits R., Meerhof R. (2011), "Kabinet accepteert zwarte scholen", *De Volksrant,* February 7 2011, http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2686/Binnenland/article/detail/1832055/2011/02/07/Kabinet-accepteert-zwarte-scholen.dhtml

Groeneveld, S.M. and Y.M.R. Weijers-Martens (2003). *Minderheden in beeld.* De SPVA-02. [Ethnic minorities in the picture. The SPVA-survey 2002]. Rotterdam: Instituut voor Sociologisch-Economisch Onderzoek (ISEO).

Janssen, Roel (2011), "Working out the Netherlands' unemployment puzzle", *The Guardian,* 1 December 2011.

Kepel, Gilles (2011), *Banlieue de la République*, Paris, Institut Montaigne.
Keuzenkamp, S. & A. Merens (eds.) (2006). *Sociale atlas van vrouwen uit etnische minderheden.* Den Haag: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau.

Klaver J., Medissen J.W.M. and Ode A.W.M. (2005), *Minderheden op de Arbeidsmarkt* (Minorities on the Labour Market), Amsterdam Regio beleidsonderzoek.

Leveau, Rémy, Mohsen-Finan, Khadija et Wihtol de Wenden, Catherine (eds.) (2001), *Nouvelles citoyennetés : réfugiés et sans-papiers dans l'espace européen*, Paris, IFRI, Institut français des relations internationales, 2001.

Levratto N., Serverin E. (2011), "Become Independent! The Paradoxical Constraints of France's Auto-Entrepreneur Regime",

http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/drmwpaper/2011-6.htm

Londen, Marieke van; Coenders, Marcel and Scheepers, Peers (2008), "Opposition to employment policy: differences in attitudes towards ethnic and income policy among Dutch majority members", Radboud University, University of Utrecht.

M&EV (Migrant and Ethnic Minority Volunteering, 2009), *Migrant and Ethnic Minority Volunteering. Summary: Final Report The Netherland.*

Maier, Robert (2002), "Immigrant students, schools and integration policies: the case of the Netherlands", paper submitted to the Conference on Immigration and Education, Torino.

Maxwell, Rahsaan (2009), "Pour en finir avec un faux débat : les statistiques ethniques", *En Temps Réel* - Cahier N°40 - Septembre 2009.

Ours, Jan van, Veenman, Julius (1999), "The Netherlands: Old Emigrants - Young Immigrant Country", IZA Discussion paper, http://ftp.iza.org/dp80.pdf

"Pôle Emploi au bord de l'explosion" (2012), *L'Expansion*, 17 January 2012, http://lexpansion.lexpress.fr/economie/pole-emploi-au-bord-de-l-implosion_278876.html

Prost, Yannick (2009), « L'intégration des immigrés en France », *Études*, Tome 410, 2009/5, (pp. 617 – 626).

Rovan, Joseph (1999), *Histoire de l'Allemagne*, Paris, Seuil.

Rudiger A., Spencer S., "Social Integration of Migrants and Ethnic Minorities", *OECD Conference Report*, 2003, p. 4.

Sengers, Erik; Sunier, Thilj (2011). *Religious Newcomers and the Nation State: Political Culture and Organized Religion in France and the Netherlands*. Eburon Uitgeverij B.V.. pp. 55–.

Spijkerman, R. (2000), *De positie van allochtonen en autochtonen in het bedrijfsleven en bij een deel van de overheid*, The Hague: Elseviers bedrijfsinformatie.

Stora, Benjamin (2001), *Algeria, 1830-2000: A Short History,* Cornell University Press.

Thuillier, Tiphaine (2012), "Auto-entrepreneur : le régime s'essouffle", *L'Entreprise,* April 2 2012, http://lentreprise.lexpress.fr/statut-creation-entreprise/auto-entrepreneur-le-regime-s-essouffle-selon-le-bilan-de-l-acoss_32359.html

Tillaart, van den (2001), *Monitor etnisch ondernemerschap 2000. Zelfstandig*

ondernemerschap van etnische minderheden in de periode 1990-2000. Nijmegen.

Veldhoen Marijke, Anneke van Doorne-Huiskes, Joop Schippers, Laura den Dulk and Tanja van der Lippe (2006) *National report the Netherlands, Socio-economic trends and welfare policies*, Utrecht University.

Veldhuis, Tinka M. & van der Maas, Titia (2011), "Immigration and Integration in the Netherlands: from multiculturalism to assimilation?", *Interculturalism, Europe and its Muslims in search of sound societal models*, Brussels, CEPS.

Vermeulen, Hans; Penninx, Rinnus (2000). *Immigrant Integration: The Dutch Case*. Het Spinhuis.

Weil, Patrick (2005), *La France et ses étrangers : l'aventure d'une politique d'immigration de 1938 à nos jours*, Paris, Gallimard.

Weil, Patrick (2004), *La République et sa diversité : immigration, intégration, discrimination*, Paris, Seuil, La République des idées.

White C.; Boucke L.; Fried G. (2010). *The UnDutchables: An Observation of the Netherlands: Its Culture and Its Inhabitants*. White/Boucke Pub.

Zanden, Jan van (1998), *The Economic History of the Netherlands 1914-1995*, London, Routledge.